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I. INTRODUCTION
[Ylou cannot abandon emphasis on "the view that business corporations
exist for the sole purpose of making profits for their stockholders" until
such time as you are prepared to offer a clear and reasonably enforce-
able scheme of responsibilities to someone else.
The impact of the law and economics movement on legal scholarship,
legal analysis, and, ultimately, on the rules under which our society oper-
ates is substantial. The proponents of this movement ("Contractarians")
articulate their positions skillfully and apply their principles broadly across
• Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. A.B., 1966, Centre Col-
lege; J.D., 1969, University of Kentucky; LL.M., 1971, Harvard University. The author ex-
presses his appreciation for reviews of drafts of this Article by James D. Cox, Thomas Lee
Hazen, and Morey W. McDaniel. Also, special thanks go to my colleagues at the University of
Kentucky John H. Garvey, Alvin L. Goldman, Thomas P. Lewis, Martin J. McMahon, and John
M. Rogers, each of whom provided thoughtful comments during the writing of this Article. Fi-
nally, I thank my research assistant Dustan Chad McCoy for the tireless efforts and questioning
attitude that he brought to the project.
1. Adolph A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV.
L. REV. 1365, 1367 (1932).
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the entire spectrum of our laws,2 including, of course, the area of corpo-
rate law.3 Their goal is to convince the rest of us that their rules and prin-
ciples are worthy of the imprimatur of society.
Regarding the fiduciary duties owed by corporate managers to the cor-
poration and its investors, it was entirely predictable that the Contractari-
ans advocate that society should have no corporate fiduciary principles.
Rather, the Contractarians argue that we are better off if society stays out
of the entire matter and leaves private parties (i.e., corporate managers
and investors) free to contract as they see fit regarding fiduciary duties.
While the arguments of the Contractarians may be appealing and certainly
the debate generated by them is enlightening,' the Contractarians will lose and,
indeed, probably already have lost their bid for the elimination of all manda-
tory corporate fiduciary principles.5 For good reasons, society is not about to
relieve corporate managers of all their fiduciary responsibilities.6
2. The law and economics movement analyzes nearly all aspects of law. See, e.g.,
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (4th ed. 1992); A. MITCHELL POLINSKY,
AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS (2d ed. 1989).
The foundation works for the Contractarian position include, or are explained in, Armen A.
Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62
AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972); Steven N. S. Cheung, The Contractual Nature of the Firm, 26
J.L. & ECON. 1 (1983); Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937);
Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen,. The Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 301 (1983); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
3. See RICHARD A. POSNER & KENNETH E. SCOTT, ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW
AND SECURITIES REGULATION (1980); ROBERTA ROMANO, FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE LAW
(1993); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL. THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW (1991) [hereinafter EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, ECONOMIC STRUCTURE];
Henry N. Butler, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 11 GEo. MASON U. L. REV. 99
(1989); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1416 (1989) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, The Corporate Contract].
4. In what is something of an overstatement but nonetheless generally correct, Kornhauser
says that the revolution in corporate law sparked by the Contractarians has "transformed not only
our understanding of the law, but the law itself .... " Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Nexus of
Contracts Approach to Corporations: A Comment on Easterbrook and Fischel, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1449 (1989).
5. Even scholars who do not accept fully the Contractarian view may consider it prema-
ture to declare that the Contractarians lost in their bid to eliminate all mandatory fiduciary du-
ties. See, e.g., Thomas L. Hazen, The Corporate Persona, Contract (and Market) Failure, and
Moral Value, 69 N.C. L. REV. 273. 288 (1991) (referring to "the demise of the fiduciary prin-
ciple in corporate governance"). Nonetheless, as more fully articulated herein, society will con-
tinue to require some significant level of fiduciary duties for corporate managers for the foresee-
able future.
Interestingly, in this regard, Professor DeMott found that fiduciary duties actually may still be
expanding into new areas. Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Ob-
ligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 909 ("commercial franchises, distributorship relationships, a
-bank's relationship with its borrowers and its depositors, and the relationship between holders of
executive and nonexecutive interests in oil and gas estates").
6. Articles expressing the varying degrees of disagreement with the Contractarian position
include Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM.
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Society's attention, therefore, should be refocused away from the
question of whether all mandatory corporate fiduciary duties ought to be
eliminated, a matter that seems to be essentially settled, and onto the mat-
ter of the appropriate shape of corporate managers' fiduciary duties.7 In
refocusing, however, we should impound the considerable wisdom we are
able to garner from the Contractarians, while at the same time we must re-
spect the widely shared societal values that led to the defeat of the Con-
tractarians' bid to eliminate all mandatory fiduciary duties.
The Contractarians argue persuasively the benefits of the capitalistic
system and the integrally related pursuit of economic efficiency.' Our so-
ciety considers appealing the personal autonomy generated by the pursuit
of economic efficiency and the fact that the system moves society gener-
ally in the direction of a maximization of total utility.' Perhaps in this era,
which shortly follows the massive and spectacular debacle of communism,
one is even more appreciative of the values that underlie and result from
the pursuit of economic efficiency.
At the same time, society is uncomfortable with the unfettered pursuit
of economic efficiency as envisioned by the Contractarians. We are un-
easy with the apparent greed and self-interest that seem to fuel the system
and the lack of grace and kindness that the Contractarians are willing to
accept. We are concerned about "losers" and repulsed in extreme cases by
the results of the allocation of resources solely to those who can pay the
most for them. We also doubt the essential factual assumptions that are
necessary to support the Contractarians' position regarding fiduciary du-
ties.
The purpose of this Article is to propose, explain, and defend broad
and unifying principles' ° to guide the development of fiduciary duties of
L. REV. 1395 (1989); Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric
of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403 (1985); Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial? A
Political and Economic Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542 (1990); Douglas M. Branson, Assault
on Another Citadel: Attempts To Curtail the Fiduciary Standard of Loyalty Applicable to Corpo-
rate Directors, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 375 (1988); DeMott, supra note 5, at 915-23; Melvin A.
Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461 (1989); Hazen, supra
note 5; John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on
Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618 (1989) [hereinafter Coffee, Essay]; John C. Coffee,
Jr., No Exit? Opting Out, the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, and the Special Case of
Remedies, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 919 (1988) [hereinafter Coffee, No Exit].
7. This is not to imply that all debates about the shape of corporate fiduciary duties were
suspended during the debate regarding elimination of mandatory fiduciary duties. Indeed, many
of the articles cited in the immediately preceding footnote deal in varying degrees with the ap-
propriate shape of mandatory fiduciary duties. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 6.
8. See infra notes 13-15 and accompanying text (defining "economic efficiency").
9. See infra notes 19-29 and accompanying text (discussing the moral justifications offered
for the pursuit of economic efficiency).
10. Some commentators express a similar view regarding the need for broadly applied
principles. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Unstable Coalitions: Corporate Governance as a
19961
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corporate managers" in the post-Contractarian period. These principles
are based on Pareto criteria," which are demonstrably appealing to society
and provide workable and morally attractive bases for a development of
corporate fiduciary rules. Thus, while the proposed principles sound not
unfamiliar, one should not underestimate the significant changes in the
present law of corporate fiduciary duties that would be wrought by a broad
application of the proposed principles.
Although the major thrust of this Article deals with traditional, broadly
formulated corporate fiduciary duties, duties that have most usually been
developed through court decisions, the principles are intended to have a
more expansive application. Specifically, the principles are proposed as
appropriate guides not only for courts applying generalized fiduciary stan-
dards but also for legislatures enacting specific laws dealing with corporate
managers' fiduciary obligations. Indeed, some of the implementations of
the principles exceed the capabilities of courts and thus require legislative
action.
In order to illuminate these principles, part II of this Article reviews the
debate between the Contractarians and those opposed to the Contractari-
ans' position ("Regulators") and proposes an explanation as to why it is
entirely appropriate that the Contractarians lost their attempt to eliminate
all mandatory fiduciary duties. Part Ill offers observations concerning
corporate managers and the other corporate constituencies affected by the
actions of corporate managers and focuses specifically on how these par-
ties act as rational maximizers. Part IV describes and defends the sug-
gested fiduciary principles. In part V, the principles are applied to familiar
corporate problems to demonstrate the sensibleness of these proposals and
the extent of the changes they effect.
Multi-Player Game, 78 GEO. L.J. 1495, 1547-48 (stating that "a narrow preoccupation with fi-
duciary duties has long been the hobgoblin of law professors"). Coffee recognizes the need for a
"fuller normative theory." Id.
11. This Article is limited in the discussion of corporate fiduciary duties to the standards
applicable to "managers," which include the traditional groups of officers and directors but ex-
clude owners. Owners may make corporate "management" decisions, when, for example, they
vote to approve a merger, and, under traditional corporate law, certain actions of majority stock-
holders have been subjected to scrutiny under fiduciary principles. See, e.g., Weinberger v.
UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (involving a fiduciary duty imposed on a majority stock-
holder voting on affiliated merger); Swinney v. Keebler Co., 329 F. Supp. 216 (D.C. 1971),
rev'd, 480 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1973) (involving a fiduciary duty imposed on a majority stock-
holder selling majority block of voting stock). Notwithstanding, out of practical necessity, the
discussion in this Article is limited to fiduciary duties as applied to "managers," although much
of what is proposed in this piece would seem applicable to stockholders' management decisions,
especially when the decisions are undertaken by a majority or controlling stockholder.
12. Pareto criteria, more specifically the concept of Pareto superiority, is defined and dis-
cussed in the discussion accompanying note 56 infra.
[Vol. 23:561
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II. THE DEBATE: OF FACTS AND VALUES
The Contractarians champion economic efficiency as a goal. Although
definitions may differ, 3 economic efficiency generally denotes a pattern of
resource allocation in which resources are allocated to the party willing to
pay most for a particular resource." Attaining economic efficiency, there-
fore, requires that the parties be permitted to trade unfettered by govern-
mental or other restraints. Without such unfettered trading, resources can-
not move into the hands of the party who is willing to pay the most for the
resources and who, accordingly, is assumed to be the most efficient user
of the resources."
Applying these concepts to corporate fiduciary duties, 6 Contractarians
view managers as sellers of fiduciary protections and corporations and
their stockholders as buyers of fiduciary protections. Thus, an economi-
cally efficient allocation of corporate fiduciary duties is achieved only
through free bargaining between corporate managers and corporations (or
the corporation's stockholders) regarding the existence and terms of man-
agers' fiduciary obligations. The mandatory imposition of fiduciary duties
on corporate managers is seen as inconsistent with achieving economic ef-
ficiency, since it limits free bargaining between the parties."JThis line of thinking, however, generally does not lead the Contractari-
ans to reject some governmental role in the formulation of fiduciary duties
but, instead, leads them to favor state-promulgated fiduciary standards as
default provisions. The now-familiar argument in this regard is based on
economy. If, over time, most corporate stockholders and managers, unfet-
tered by governmental rules, select certain fiduciary duties as a part of
their contract, utilization of those fiduciary duties as default provisions is
economical, since the parties and society are spared the expenses of nego-
tiating and drafting the fiduciary duties.' 8 If particular stockholders and
13. For a discussion of other definitions of economic efficiency, see Jules L. Coleman, Ef-
ficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509, 512 (1980).
14. See POSNER, supra note 2, at 11-15.
15. Posner characterizes the permissibility of voluntary exchanges as a "basic economic
principle" and discusses its integral role in achieving economic efficiency. POSNER, supra note
2, at 9-15.
16. For an overview of the Contractarian position on corporate fiduciary duties, see Butler,
supra note 3.
17. In arguing that managers and investors should be left free to determine the extent, if
any, of managers' fiduciary duties. Easterbrook and Fischel state, "[Jiust as there is no right
amount of paint in a car, there is no right relation among managers, investors, and other corpo-
rate participants." Easterbrook & Fischel, The Corporate Contract, supra note 3, at 1428.
18. See, e.g., id. at 1433, 1444-45. More specifically, Contractarians argue that society
should enact corporate law that "fills in the blanks and oversights with the terms that people
would have bargained for had they anticipated the problems and been able to transact costlessly
in advance." Id. at 1445. In another piece, Professor Fischel states that "optimal fiduciary duties
should approximate the bargain that investors and managers would reach if transaction costs were
zero." Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1264
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managers enter into a contract that expressly overrides the default provi-
sions, of course the Contractarians would give effect to the override pro-
visions.
Contractarians, when called upon to provide a moral justification for
their position, concede the instrumental nature of economic efficiency and,
accordingly, defend their position by reference to other, more fundamental
values. 9 One such defense is based on utilitarian notions ° and proposes
that the pursuit of economic efficiency will lead in the direction of maxi-
mum total utility (happiness)." Unfettered rights of the parties to effect
voluntary trades that each considers in his or her best interests, by defini-
tion, must increase the total utility of the trading parties.2 Utilitarianism,
however, has been subjected to significant criticisms over the years" and
has led to alternative justifications for pursuing economic efficiency.24
(1982). Judge Posner suggests that implied consent may be inferred "by trying to answer the hy-
pothetical question whether, if transaction costs were zero, the affected parties would have
agreed . . ." Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in
Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 494 (1980).
19. Thus, for example, Posner defends his own concept of efficiency, which he views as
wealth maximization, as a concept that, if pursued, "will produce an ethically attractive combi-
nation of happiness, of rights (to liberty and property), and of sharing with less fortunate mem-
bers of society." Posner, supra note 18, at 487. See also Coleman, supra note 13, at 528-30.
Both Calabresi and Dworkin have observed that wealth maximization as a goal must be consid-
ered only instrumental. Guido Calabresi, An Exchange: About Law and Economics; A Letter to
Ronald Dworkin, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 553, 556 (1980); Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a
Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980).
20. The works of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill provided the foundations for utili-
tarianism. See JEREMY BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (1789); JOHN
STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM (1863). For modern discussions of utilitarianism, see J.J.C.
SMART & B. WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM (1973); H.L.A. Hart, Between Utility and Rights, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 828 (1979).
21. See Coleman, supra note 13, at 510. Professor Stone describes the pursuit of wealth
maximization as a "crude sort of utilitarianism." Christopher D. Stone, Corporate Social Re-
sponsibility: What It Might Mean, If It Were Really To Matter, 71 IOWA L. REV. 557, 570
(1986).
The pursuit of economic efficiency, certainly if defined as Pareto criteria, has been viewed as
promoting the utilitarian goal of maximizing total utility. Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism,
Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979); Posner, supra note 18, at 491-92
(describing Pareto superiority as having a "utilitarian premise").
22. Obviously, this still leaves the problems of externalities or adverse effects on non-trading parties.
23. Coleman summarizes these criticisms as "those which do not question the consequen-
tialist character of utilitarianism" (e.g., criticisms based on the uncertainty of "whose utilities or
preferences should count and which of a person's preferences should count; " criticisms based on
distributive considerations: and criticisms based on the "interpersonal-utility comparison prob-
lem"), as well as those criticisms that do question the consequentialist character of utilitarianism
(e.g., the criticism "that utilitarianism is an impoverished moral theory, incapable of accounting
for the full range of moral obligation and right action"). Coleman, supra note 13, at 511. Re-
lated to the latter, Judge Posner observed, "The fact that one person has a greater capacity for
pleasure than another is not a very good reason for a forced transfer of wealth from the second to
the first." POSNER, supra note 2, at 12. Hart recognizes that utilitarianism "ignores . . . the
moral importance of the separateness of persons." Hart, supra note 20, at 831. Professor
Dworkin states, harshly, that "utilitarianism, as a general theory of either value or justice, is
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Maximization of personal autonomy is offered as one such justification
for the pursuit of economic efficiency. Market transactions and the pursuit
of economic efficiency are morally justified, proponents argue, if they are
the result of freely given consent. Such consent to transactions ensures
autonomy, which is valued for its own sake and without regard to its rela-
tionship to total happiness or utility. 5 This line of argument is based on
Kantian traditions1 and proffered in different settings by scholars includ-
ing Robert Nozik27 and Richard Epstein.28 Judge Posner also employs con-
sent and promotion of personal autonomy in his defense of the pursuit of
wealth maximization.2 9
Notwithstanding the arguments of the Contractarians, and even though
they may have won a skirmish or two in the area of corporate fiduciary
duties, society, for sound reasons that are articulated by Regulators, is not
about to give up on its longstanding" commitment to protect shareholders
through the imposition of fiduciary duties.' Indeed, in considering this
matter, one must be careful not to overestimate or misinterpret the Con-
tractarian "victories."
At least some of the Contractarian "victories" may be more reflective of a
discrete game of power politics than of any shift in public values. For exam-
ple, a number of state legislatures, including my home state of Kentucky,
passed a typical and apparently Contractarian statute that permits corporations
to adopt an article of incorporation limiting directors' liability for monetary
damages to instances involving bad faith or intentional misconduct." The
false and its present unpopularity is well-deserved." Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9
J. LEGAL STUD. 191, 216 (1980).
24. For an excellent comparison of utilitarianism and Kantianism, the two moral theories
most prevalently employed in the moral justification for capitalism and, more specifically, the
pursuit of economic efficiency, see JEFFERIE G. MURPHY & JULES L. COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY
OF LAW 70-82 (1990).
25. For a discussion and criticism of this line of reasoning, see Coleman, supra note 13, at
531-40.
26. For a compact, but elegant description of Kantianism, see MURPHY & COLEMAN, su-
pra note 24, at 75-82. Separately, Murphy has written extensively about Kant. J. MURPHY,
KANT: THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (1970).
27. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974).
28. See Richard A. Epstein, Causation and Corrective Justice: A Reply to Two Critics, 8 J.
LEGAL STUD. 477, 487-88 (1979). Professor Epstein uses the advance of individual autonomy as a
basis to support the legitimacy of the employment-at-will doctrine. Richard A. Epstein, In Defense
of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 951 (1984) [hereinafter Epstein, InDefense].
29. See Posner, supra note 18.
30. In her work, Frankel reports that corporate fiduciary duties "originated with the forma-
tion of ... corporations . . . . " Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REv. 795 (1983).
31. This view may not be shared by all Regulators. See, e.g., Hazen, supra 3 note 5, at 275
(stating that his article "examines the demise of the fiduciary principle in corporate governance").
32. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 271B.2-020(d) (Baldwin 1994). The Kentucky provision,
which is based roughly on the 1994 Revised Model Business Corporation Act (RMBCA),
RMBCA § 2.02(b)(4) (1994), permits the articles of incorporation to limit monetary recovery against
directors to "acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct." Section
1996]
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Kentucky statute, however, was passed in a busy legislative session and
was buried in the adoption of the Revised Model Business Corporation Act
(RMBCA). The entire adoption process was dominated by corporate man-
agers and their agents. While, over time, one is able glean societal values
through legislation and court-made rules (indeed, later in this Article court
and legislative rules are relied on heavily as an indication of societal val-
ues), one statute passed in such an atmosphere may be somewhat less per-
suasive of any widely held Contractarian values.
Additionally, even the statutes that appear to opt for some Contractar-
ian philosophy often retain a decidedly Regulator approach. Referring
again, for example, to corporate statutes that permit limiting directors' li-
ability by an amendment to a corporation's articles of incorporation, direc-
tors under those statutes are still subject to a baseline fiduciary standard
that cannot be avoided by contract. Also, the statutes often do not apply to
officers."
In looking at statutory developments, one finds that the RMBCA actu-
ally increases the mandatory protection for stockholders by expanding the
coverage of appraisal rights to include certain amendments to corporations'
articles of incorporation.34 Prior to the adoption of the RMBCA, most state
statutes did not grant appraisal rights to stockholders whose rights were af-
fected by amendments to a company's articles of incorporation, 5 notwith-
standing the existence of notorious examples in which such amendments
were used as vehicles to expropriate the wealth of preferred stockholders.36
2.02(b)(4), however, uses the terms "intentional misconduct" as the extent of the right to limit
monetary recovery against directors.
33. In Kentucky, for example, the right to limit liability applies only to directors (i.e., offi-
cers' liability cannot be limited by a company's articles of incorporation) and does not include
permission to eliminate or limit a director's liability for conflict transactions, a breach of good
faith, intentional misconduct, knowing violations of the law, or transactions where "the director
derived an improper personal benefit." KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.2-020(2)(d) (Baldwin
1994).
34. The RMBCA grants appraisal rights in the case of amendments that "materially and ad-
versely" affect certain of the stockholders' rights, including preferential rights, redemption
rights, preemptive rights, or voting rights. RMBCA § 13.02(a)(4) (1994).
35. The Model Business Corporation Act, for example, limited the availability of appraisal
rights to mergers, consolidations, and sales of substantially all of a corporation's assets other
than in the regular course of business. MBCA § 80 (1991).
36. See, e.g., Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp., 53 F. Supp. 198 (Del. D. 1943), aff'd,
146 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1944); Goldman v. Postal Tel., Inc., 52 F. Supp. 763 (Del. D. 1943).
The unfairness visited on preferred stockholders in single-company recapitalization cases gen-
erally attracted a lot of attention in earlier times. See, e.g., E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Fair and
Equitable Recapitalizations, 55 HARV. L. REV. 780 (1942); Norman D. Lattin, A Primer on
Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1 W. RES. L. REV. 3 (1949); Arno C. Becht, Corporate
Charter Amendments: Issues of Prior Stock and the Alteration of Dividend Rates, 50 COLUM. L.
REV. 900 (1950) (hereinafter Becht, Charter Amendments]; Arno C. Becht, Changes in the In-
terests of Classes of Stockholders by Corporate Charter Amendments Reducing Capital and Alter-
ing Redemption, Liquidation and Sinking Fund Provisions, 36 CORNELL L.Q. 1 (1950)
[hereinafter Becht, Classes of Stockholdersl.
[Vol. 23:561
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The RMBCA deals with this by mandatorily imposing appraisal rights on
such transactions, a resolution that obviously is inconsistent with the Con-
tractarian philosophy.
Finally and more generally, some commentators have observed an in-
crease in society's general affinity for fiduciary duties. In a 1988 article,
Deborah DeMott reminds us that, in recent years, courts have been willing
to expand fiduciary protections into new areas, 7 and, in an earlier piece,
Tamar Frankel opines that "[tihe twentieth century is witnessing an un-
precedented expansion and development of the fiduciary law."38
Society continues to endorse the Regulators' view of corporate fiduci-
ary duties for two reasons. First, the position of the Regulators better re-
flects the facts; second, the values that underlie the Regulators' positions
are more closely aligned with society's shared values.
The facts as imagined by the Contractarians39 are that no significant
market failures exist 40 and, thus, the parties (i.e., investors and managers)
are able to effect the trades necessary to reach economic efficiency regard-
ing fiduciary duties. Alternatively, Contractarians imagine that even if
significant market failures do exist, no substitute system of resource allo-
cation (legally mandated rules, for example) is more efficient than the free
market, even with its flaws. 4' Contractarians also are less likely than
Not surprisingly, the most perceptive of the more modern works is by Brudney, and his piece
contains many of his observations about market failures and bargaining inequities among inves-
tors and managers. See Victor Brudney, Standards of Fairness and the Limits of Preferred Stock
Modifications, 26 RUTGERS L. REV. 445 (1973).
37. DeMott, supra note 5, at 909.
38. Frankel, supra note 30, at 796.
39. See Ronald Daniels, Stakeholders and Takeovers: Can Contractarianism Be Compas-
sionate?, 43 TORONTO L.J. 315, 327 (1993) (describing the factual assumptions underpinning
the Contractarian position).
40. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, The Corporate Contract, supra note 3, at 1430
("Investors ... can participate or go elsewhere. . . .[Entrepreneurs or managers] cannot force
investors to pay more than what the resulting investment instruments are worth; there are too
many other places to put one's money."). The authors also note that "prices quickly and accu-
rately reflect public information about firms," Id. at 1431. The authors also state that "lilt turns
out to be hard to find any interesting item that does not have an influence on price." Id. at 1432.
Easterbrook and Fisehel also argue that the market works to protect ignorant and unsophisticated
investors through, in part, the influence of professional traders on the market price. Id. at 1435.
The authors concede that market failures may exist in midstream adjustments of corporate gov-
ernance provisions. Id. at 1442-44. Contractarians also do not necessarily reject the possibility of
opportunistic conduct by management. See, e.g., Butler, supra note 3, at 119 ("[The market
mechanisms may he inadequate to deal with last-period, or one-time, divergences when the agent
rationally concludes that the benefits of the one-time use of discretion is worth whatever penalties
may be forthcoming in the employment market for the agent's services.").
A thoughtful and interesting piece regarding market efficiency, which contains an outstanding
survey of the literature in the area, is Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Secu-
rities Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851 (1992).
41. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Corporate Contract, supra note 3, at 1432 ("lIlt does
not matter if markets are not perfectly efficient, unless some other societal institution does better
at evaluating the likely effects of corporate governance devices. The prices will be more informative
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Regulators to imagine that private arrangements between the parties have
significant third-party effects. 42
Regulators, on the other hand, dispute the existence of the factual un-
derpinning of the Contractarian position 3 and argue that significant market
failures" are typically present in the process of contracting for fiduciary
duties. Concerning bargaining by the stockholders who first purchase from
the issuer, Regulators opine that such investors are often scattered, unso-
phisticated, and rationally ignorant regarding the fiduciary duties for
which they are "contracting. "' Although in a public offering underwriters
conceivably could act on behalf of such shareholders to evaluate and prop-
erly price contractual fiduciary duties, Regulators generally argue that un-
derwriters have an interest in overpricing securities to investors in order to
garner repeat business from the issuer. Thus, the fear is that underwriters
will underprice any initial contractual limitations of fiduciary duties. 46
Regulators are even more pessimistic about the "bargaining" that goes on
if fiduciary duties are contractually limited in midstream.47 Here Regulators
than the next best alternative, which is all anyone can demand of any device."). Coase expressed
this idea earlier. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
42. Easterbrook & Fischel, The Corporate Contract, supra note 3, at 1429-30 ("The corpo-
ration's choice of governance mechanisms does not create substantial third-party effects-that is,
does not injure persons who are not voluntary participants in the venture.").
43. For a list of the underlying assumptions of the Contractarian position, see Daniels, su-
pra note 39, at 327.
44. Market failures exist when parties are impeded in their trading to the extent that re-
sources cannot flow to those who are willing to pay the most for them. Hazen says that "market
failure may occur when transactions do not result from meaningful consent of both parties."
Hazen, supra note 5, at 276. Coleman defines market failure as -the failure of agents acting on
purely individually maximizing strategies to secure a Pareto optimal or collectively rational out-
come." Jules L. Coleman, Afterward: The Rational Choice Approach to Legal Rules, 65 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 177, 179 (1989). Without using the specific term, Brudney appears to consider
market failure as the inability to "effect Pareto superiority or maximize efficiency." Brudney,
supra note 6, at 1411.
45. See, e.g., Brudney, supra note 6, at 1420 ("Illnvestors in large publicly held corpora-
tions have little or no ability to choose or negotiate the terms of management with original own-
ers who go public or with corporate management."); Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 1521 ("It is no
more likely that buyers in an initial public offering would know of variations in core fiduciary
and structural rules than that buyers of insurance policies will know the fine print in their poli-
cies."); Hazen, supra note 5, at 300 ("Consent is no more meaningful in a firm that is about to
go public than it is in a firm that is already publicly held."). Bebchuk, however, considers the
potential for abuse less in instances of initial sales of securities by corporations than in midstream
corrections. Bebchuk, supra note 6.
46. See, e.g., Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Fairness Rights of Corporate Bondholders, 65
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1183 (1990); Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 1518-19; William W. Bratton,
Corporate Debt Relationships: Legal Theory in a Time of Restructuring, 89 DUKE L.J. 92, 156
(1989); Dale B. Tauke, Should Bonds Have More Fun? A Reexamination of the Debate over
Corporate Bondholder Rights, COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1, 22-26 (1989).
47. Contractarians admit this is their toughest case. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, The
Corporate Contract, supra note 3, at 1442-44. On a theoretical level, however, I fail to see the
difficulty for Contractarians. The obvious theoretical answer is that the market discounts the ini-
tial price of the investment to reflect the risk of a midstream adjustment. Assumedly, the reason
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argue that the proxy machinery typically activated to amend fiduciary du-
ties does not ensure any meaningful bargaining. Again, stockholders gen-
erally are scattered, rationally ignorant, unsophisticated, and powerless to
defend against detrimental changes in fiduciary rules effected in mid-
stream. Mechanistically and economically, shareholders are unable to
protect themselves. Regulators are similarly pessimistic that other factors,
such as the market for corporate control,48 will adequately protect corpo-
rate stockholders subjected to midstream adjustments in their contract. 9
While proving market failures is necessarily difficult,"0 the Regulators
generally have the more accurate view of the facts, and the plausibility of
this view explains, at least partially, why society is unwilling to accept the
Contractarians' demand for the elimination of all mandatory corporate fi-
duciary duties.
Certainly my own experiences and observations, both as a transactional
attorney and a law professor, support a conclusion that market failures are
not trivial. For example, the very cases from which I teach my courses in
Corporations and Corporate Finance involve numerous examples of situa-
tions that are best interpreted as market failures, cases with facts that make
it impossible to find that the parties bargained for, priced, and allocated
the risks to which they were later subjected. Examples include voluntary
recapitalizations in which preferred shareholders are effectively forced to
surrender or exchange their arrearage or other valuable contractual rights
for less than fair consideration,51 freezeouts of minority shareholders at
Easterbrook and Fischel do not make that argument is because they believe that there is a market
failure respecting this term.
But to argue ex ante consent and payment for assuming the risk of a midstream adjustment
seems less of a stretch than arguing, for example, that citizens consent to a negligence-based tort
recovery system by accepting ex ante compensation. Such compensation, it is argued, is a result
of the relatively lower operational costs of the system, which, it is assumed, would be consented
to ex ante even by those who later may be denied recovery that they would have received under a
strict liability system. See Posner, supra note 18, at 492-96.
48. Contractarians argue the therapeutic value of the market for corporate control. See,
e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1165-74 (1981); Henry G. Manne,
Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 113 (1965). Applied
here, the argument would run as follows: If management constructs fiduciary duties that are un-
fair vis-A-vis shareholders, the market value of the stock will go down, which will make the
company subject to a hostile takeover. This threat keeps managers from charging too much for
their services (in this case, in the form of reduced fiduciary duties).
49. Brudney finds that neither the market for managers nor the market for securities does
much to overcome the bargaining defects. See Brudney, supra note 6, at 1420-47. Eisenberg ex-
plores a broader array of market forces and concludes that the forces do not eliminate the need
for certain mandatory fiduciary principles. See Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 1488-1514.
50. 1 concede as, I trust, does the other side of the debate, the correctness of Coffee's
statement that "[mlarket failures are easier to predict than prove." Coffee, supra note 10, at
1511.
51. Cases involving the elimination of preferred arrearage include Barrett v. Denver
Tramway Corp., 53 F. Supp. 198 (Del. D. 1943), aff'd, 146 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1944); Western
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less than the fair market value of their stock,52 situations in which inves-
tors' value is devastated by the sale of the company to a corporate looter,53
and highly leveraged transactions that dramatically decrease the value of
investors' securities.5 4 All of these cases involve instances in which it is
probable that investors, due to market failures, did not bargain for, accept,
or receive ex ante compensation for the risks of the particular occurrences
or transactions.
Contractarians also are out of line with the Regulators and society on
the matter of values. Generally, as concerns corporate managers' obliga-
tions to stockholders, Regulators and society are attracted by Pareto con-
cepts, while Contractarians are attracted by the concept of Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency.5" This difference reflects fundamentally disparate views regard-
ing the treatment of losers in transactions.
Any move (or decision) is Pareto superior if no one is made worse off
and at least one person is made better off by the move.56 On the other
hand, a move is Kaldor-Hicks efficient even if there are losers, so long as
the winners in the move could compensate the losers, whether or not such
compensation in fact occurs.5 7 Thus, Pareto concepts, as a measure of
managers' fiduciary duties to stockholders, reflect a strong concern for indi-
vidual losers and, in fact, ensure the absence of losers, while Kaldor-Hicks
Foundry Co. v. Wicker, 85 N.E.2d 722 (II1. 1949); State v. Bechtel, 31 N.W.2d 853 (Iowa
1948), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 918 (1949); Dratz v. Occidental Hotel Co., 39 N.W.2d 341
(Mich. 1949); Wessel v. Guantanamo Sugar Co., 35 A.2d 215 (N.J. Ch.), aff'd, 39 A.2d 431
(N.J. 1944); Buckley v. Cuban Am. Sugar Co., 19 A.2d 820 (N.J. Ch. 1940); Bove v. Com-
munity Hotel Corp. of Newport, R.I., 249 A.2d 89 (R.I. 1969). Much has been written on this
matter, although most pieces are somewhat older. See, e.g., Arno C. Becht, Alterations of Ac-
crued Dividends: 1, 49 MICH. L. REV. 363, 565 (1951); E. Merrick Dodd, Accrued Dividends in
Delaware Corporations-From Vested Rights to Mirage, 57 HARV. L. REV. 894 (1944); E.R.
Latty, Fairness-The Focal Point in Preferred Stock Arrearage Elimination, 29 VA. L. REV. 1
(1942). Professor Brudney's piece on this matter is outstanding. See Brudney, supra note 36.
52. Examples of cases in which minority stockholders complained of unfairness in a
freezeout situation include Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983), and Berkowitz
v. Power/Mate Corp., 342 A.2d 566 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975). One of the most egre-
gious examples of mistreatment of minority stockholders in a freezeout is Matteson v. Ziebarth,
242 P.2d 1025 (Wash. 1952).
53. Swinney v. Keebler Co.. 329 F. Supp. 216 (D.C. 1971), rev'd, 480 F.2d 573 (4th Cir.
1973), is an interesting case involving a sale to a corporate looter, although the suit was brought
on behalf of creditors (debentureholders), rather than minority stockholders.
54. See infra notes 139-45 and accompanying discussion. Coffee renders an especially en-
lightening account of the market failures that affected bondholders in the 1980s. See Coffee, su-
pra note 10, at 1505-15.
55. Some Contractarians advocate the goal of wealth maximization. See, e.g., Posner, su-
pra note 18, at 487. In any event, the fundamental point is that individual losers seem to be of
little concern to Contractarians.
56. MURPHY & COLEMAN, supra note 24, at 182-85. Pareto criteria are discussed more
extensively in Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Exchange, and Auction: Philosophic Aspects of the
Economic Approach to Law, 68 CAL. L. REV. 221 (1980).
57. MURPHY & COLEMAN, supra note 24, at 186.
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concepts, as a measure of corporate managers' fiduciary duties, do not en-
sure the absence of losers.
Society is concerned about individual losers in corporate transactions
and thus attracted to Pareto concepts."8 This is the reason, for example,
that both courts and legislatures have generated rules requiring minority
stockholders in an affiliated merger to receive fair consideration for their
stock. Although managers and the majority stockholders may effect the
"move" (i.e., the merger), the intrinsic fairness test is designed to provide
the minority stockholders with a "fair price" in the merger,59 and statutory
appraisal rights permit dissatisfied stockholders the option of demanding
cash equal to the "fair value" of their stock 0
Society's attraction to Pareto concepts also is evidenced by the way courts
and legislatures deal with the claims of preferred stockholders in single-
company recapitalizations, 61 although, admittedly, the poor analyses and
sloppy crafting in many of the court decisions make this evidence less persua-
sive than it should be.12 Nonetheless, courts, acting under their common law
powers, generally recognize limits on the concessions that preferred stock-
holders can be asked (or forced) to make in single-company recapitalizations
and state that such recapitalizations cannot be effected if the terms of the trans-
action are "unfair," "grossly unfair," or amount to "constructive fraud." 6
58. McDaniel observes that economists do not care "about losses to individuals .... Judges
do care about individual losses." Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Stockholders, 13 J.
CORP. L. 205, 243 (1988). Society's aversion to transactions generating individual losers leads
Professor Coffee to conclude that the takeovers may not remain "politically viable" unless con-
stituency losses are eliminated. Coffee, supra note 10, at 1548.
59. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
60. Legislatures have enacted appraisal statutes to ensure that stockholders receive "fair
value" in mergers and other corporate reorganizations. See, e.g., RMBCA §§ 13.01-.03 (1994).
61. Single-company recapitalizations are situations in which the rights of stockholders are
altered by some corporate action, most typically by a merger with a shell company or amend-
ments to the company's articles of incorporation.
62. Critical comment includes Becht, Charter Amendments, supra note 36; Becht, Classes
of Stockholders, supra note 36; E. Merrick Dodd, Fair and Equitable Recapitalizations, 55
HARV. L. REV. 780 (1942); Elvin R. Latty, Exploration of Legislative Remedy for Prejudicial
Changes in Senior Shares, 19 U. CMit. L. REV. 759 (1952); Comment, A Standard of Fairness
for Compensating Preferred Shareholders in Corporate Recapitalizations, 33 U. CHi. L. REV. 97
(1965); Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., Voluntary Recapitalizations, Fairness, and Rule 10b-5: Life
Along the Trail of Santa Fe, 66 KY. L.J. 267 (1977).
63. Bailey v. Tubize Rayon Corp., 56 F. Supp. 418, 422 (Del. D. 1944) (employing the
terminology "so unfair as to amount to constructive fraud" and "gross unfairness, " although the
analysis looks more like a fairness analysis under the old Delaware block approach); Barrett v.
Denver Tramway Corp. 53 F. Supp. 198 (Del. D. 1943), aff'd, 146 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1944)
(referring to "constructive fraud," "bad faith," and "gross unfairness"); Bove v. Community
Hotel Corp. of Newport, Rhode Island, 249 A.2d 89 (R.I. 1969) (refusing to select standard
since the recapitalization met even the most rigorous standard of fairness).
In other instances, however, courts have indicated that no fiduciary or equitable rules are im-
plicated by single-company recapitalizations. See Goldman v. Postal Tel., Inc., 52 F. Supp. 763
(Del. D. 1948); Franzblau v. Capital Sec. Co., 64 F.2d 744 (N.J. 1949).
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These cases (most of which are older) reflect, therefore, the general concern
that preferred stockholders not be made losers (or at least significant los-
ers) in recapitalizations.
Legislative action on the matter is even clearer. Single-company recapi-
talizations structured as mergers normally generate statutory appraisal
rights, although, generally until relatively recently, recapitalizations ef-
fected through amendments to the company's articles of incorporation did
not trigger appraisal rights. 64 The RMBCA, however, closes this gap by
also providing for appraisal rights when preferred stockholders are sub-
jected to amendments that "materially and adversely" affect stockholders'
rights.6 Appraisal rights, which are designed to prevent losers, or at least
limit the amount of the losses, are, therefore, now broadly available under
the RMBCA to protect preferred stockholders in a single-company recapi-
talization.
The position of the Contractarians leads to a quite different analysis and
result. Thus, for example, in an affiliated merger, the Contractarians
would argue that society should, from the beginning, impose no manda-
tory fiduciary constraint on such situations but should, instead, rely on a
market solution. Even if the affiliated merger causes a loss for the minor-
ity stockholders, the Contractarians are apparently confident and morally
satisfied that the market will correct this in future transactions either by
future stock purchasers' requiring a higher return to. pay them for this risk
or, by the inclusion in the future stockholders' contracts of a term that
prohibits affiliated mergers or limits affiliated mergers to situations that
are not harmful to minority stockholders.
The Contractarian solution, of course, is based on a series of assump-
tions about which some may disagree. As examples, the Contractarians
would ask us to believe that all (most?) markets would immediately
(before too long?) adjust to the newly discovered risk and impound that
risk in the price of all (most?) future sales of the particular investment
contract. Obviously, some may be unwilling to accept these factual as-
sumptions.
More to the point of this part of the discussion, however, is the fact
that even if the market is as efficient as the Contractarians assume, society
and the Regulators are concerned about the first case.6 First investors,
those who are the minority stockholders or preferred stockholders sub-
jected to the affiliated merger or the recapitalization, should not be turned
64. MBCA § 80 (1991).
65. RMBCA § 13.02(4) (1994).
66. See, e.g., McDaniel, supra note 58, at 243 (arguing that individual investors who suf-
fer losses from wrongful management decisions are entitled to compensation regardless of the
aggregate behavior of the market). For an interesting and thoughtful consideration of the "first
case" problem, see Ronald Dworkin, Why Efficiency?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 563, 584-90 (1983).
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into cannon fodder for future generations of investors. The fact that the
market may correct future situations says nothing about the unfairness or
fairness of the first case. The Regulators and society share the view that it
is unfair for managers and other constituencies to subject stockholders to
wealth-diminishing moves, unless it is demonstrable that stockholders
were paid to take the risk of such transactions. 67
The general uneasiness over the unrestrained pursuit of economic effi-
ciency is based on more than just a concern for uncompensated losers, how-
ever. The unrestrained pursuit of economic efficiency may also be troubling
because it arguably is fueled by some of the least attractive characteristics of
the human spirit. Euphemisms such as "rational maximizer" and "utility-
seeking individual, 68 accordingly, may be viewed by some as a thin mask for
greed and selfishness, 69 characteristics that we insist that our children reject, or
at least temper substantially, as part of the early maturation process.
The pursuit of economic efficiency also will at times lead to resource allo-
cations that are shocking. For example, Posner bravely provides a hypothetical
situation in which a poor child will be a dwarf unless he gets an expensive pi-
tuitary extract.70 The child of rich parents, however, will grow to a normal
height without the extract, but by obtaining the extract the rich parents can en-
sure that their child will grow a few extra inches above normal. Since the rich
child's parents can pay for the extract, he gets the drug, and the poor child,
who clearly has the greater need, is denied the extract. While such an alloca-
tion may be efficient under Posner's definition, the result is unsatisfactory
to most of us.7'
67. This last statement, that wealth-diminishing moves should be permitted if there is pay-
ment for taking the risk of such moves, opens up a significant line of consideration that will be
dealt with later but that needs to be explained here, at least briefly.
Regulators concede the appropriateness of, or at least have not objected to, a contract between
shareholders and managers defining to some extent management's fiduciary duties owed to
shareholders. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 1463-80; Coffee, Essay, supra note 6. For
example, Regulators would be unlikely to argue that redemption provisions in preferred share-
holders' contracts should be considered unenforceable as inconsistent with management's fiduci-
ary duty to shareholders. The exercise of a redemption privilege, however, is contrary to the best
interests of the preferred stockholders who are subjected to the redemption. If interest rates go
down and, as a result, a preferred share of stock would be worth more (but for the redemption
provision), the preferred shareholders would be better off if management announced that they
never intended to call the stock. The reason Regulators would not require management to forego
the exercise of the redemption right is that the preferred shareholders have contracted for and are
being paid to take the risk of redemption. In other words, it is permissible for managers to act
contrary to the best interests of shareholders by redeeming stock because the parties consented to
the redemption. These ideas are developed more fully later.
68. This euphemism is used by Posner, supra note 18, at 497.
69. Disagreement exists on this point. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 2, at 4 ("[S]elf-
interest should not be confused with selfishness.").
70. Id. at 13.
71. Posner's answers to this are brief, stating only that he makes no attempt "to defend ef-
ficiency as the only worthwhile criterion of social choice." Id. Most interestingly, in the previ-
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Rules that promote unfettered pursuit 'of economic efficiency are rules
of the jungle. Just as the jungle produces beauty and a diverse array of
strong and healthy vegetation and wildlife, pursuit of economic efficiency
produces a diverse array of strong economic units that operate efficiently.
Notwithstanding the beauty of the jungle, however, most are unable to
watch, without at least some degree of squeamishness, a lion catch and
devour a sickly fawn. We understand that the fawn is weak and possibly
genetically imperfect and that allowing the lion to have its way with the
fawn may ultimately make the entire race stronger and better competitors.
However, our instincts are to try to make the fawn well rather than to al-
low the lion to make a meal of this pitiful and delicate creature. Values
other than the preservation of the jungle-values such as fairness, com-
passion, and decency-come into play and may cause us to intercede on
behalf of the fawn.
The trick for society is to impound the wisdom of the Contractarians
and gain the benefits of enhanced economic efficiency72 while, at the same
time, to soften the hard edges of capitalism by injecting widely held values
of society. 7 The failure of the law and economics movement to accomplish,
ous edition of his book, Posner opines that the limitations of economic efficiency as an ethical
criterion are "perhaps not serious ones, as such examples [as the pituitary extract case] are very
rare." RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 13 (3d ed. 1986). That statement is
quite curious. So long as dollars are distributed unevenly in society and the marginal value of
dollars decreases as one acquires more dollars, a large percentage of all purchases by the rich
will generate less utility for the rich than would have been generated if the goods that were the
subject of the purchase had been allocated to a poor person. The point is that although the extremeness
of Posner's example may appear to him to be a "very rare" situation, the broader version of the
problem is nearly ubiquitous.
72. Regulators readily concede that economic efficiency is worth pursuing. They agree that
value is created by allowing parties the right to enter into contracts that they consider mutually
beneficial. They do not deny that the increased total utility and autonomy resulting from such
transactions are worthy goals for society. For example, Professor Eisenberg states:
It is a general principle of law that a bargain should normally be enforced according to
its terms, without regard to whether it is reasonable or fair. One reason for this prin-
ciple is that bargains have social utility because they create joint value through trade.
Another reason is that a fully informed party is normally the best judge of his own
utility or interest and, therefore, of the value to him of a bargained-for performance.
Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 1463.
73. This position may not be inconsistent with the view of the Contractarians, who do not
necessarily reject the importance of values other than economic efficiency. In fact, some
economists argue that economic analyses should be entirely value-neutral. The articulated aim of
these economists is "to determine which sort of rules or policies would be efficient in the ab-
stract." This type of analysis says "nothing about the types of policies governments should im-
pose .... " Coleman, supra note 13, at 549. As examples of this positive approach, Coleman
cites A. Mitchell Polinsky, Private Versus Public Enforcement of Fines. 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 105
(1980); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Probabilistic Compensation Criteria, 86 Q.J. ECON. 407 (1972);
Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980).
More typically and more genuinely, Contractarians defend strongly the value of promoting
economic efficiency. They view the pursuit of economic efficiency as a morally justifiable en-
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or, indeed, even to attempt this task is at the heart of the reason society
rejects Contractarian views regarding corporate fiduciary duties.
III. CORPORATE CONSTITUENCIES AS RATIONAL MAXIMIZERS
The success or failure of a corporation affects many constituencies, in-
cluding persons investing money in the corporation ("money investors,"
generally stockholders and creditors), persons investing human capital in
the corporation ("human capital investors," generally employees, includ-
ing corporate managers such as senior officers and directors), and more
remote constituencies ("remote constituencies," such as suppliers and the
community). It is helpful at this point to describe briefly the constituen-
cies, to outline in the most general terms how certain of those constituen-
cies act, assuming they are rational maximizers, and to offer an observa-
tion regarding the complications caused by remote constituencies.
Money investors in a corporation are normally easy to identify and in-
clude, depending on the capital structure of the particular corporation,
common shareholders, preferred shareholders, debentureholders, bond-
holders, noteholders, and general unsecured creditors.7" Although each of
these groups has different rights, they also exhibit striking similarities. All
have invested money in the corporation in the hope of earning a return on
their investment, and all depend to a large degree on the skills of manag-
ers to provide them with a return on their money. Interestingly, however,
under the law as it presently stands, corporate managers owe fiduciary
duties only to common and preferred stockholders.
Human capital investors, 7 as stated above, include directors, officers and
employees, all persons contributing services to the corporation in return for
deavor and thus advocate that "governments should intervene in human affairs or rearrange socio-
political and legal institutions to promote efficiency." Coleman, supra note 13, at 549.
In any event, the fact that Contractarians and economists value economic efficiency and desire
to enhance utility and autonomy does not necessarily mean that they do not recognize the signifi-
cance of other values. To quote one of the champions of the law and economics movement,
Judge Posner: "[Economics] does [not] answer the ultimate question of whether an efficient allo-
cation of resources would be socially or ethically desirable." POSNER, supra note 2, at 14. In his
other writings, however, Posner does deal with the question of whether an efficient allocation of
resources is ethically desirable; he concludes it is. See Posner, supra note 18; Posner, supra note
21.
74. Of course, the rights of debentureholders, bondholders, noteholders, and general unse-
cured trade creditors will vary from corporation to corporation and, even within a single corpo-
ration, may break down into various classes or "series" that have different rights and obliga-
tions.
75. Under "human capital investors," I include "managers" (i.e., directors and officers) as
a part of "employees." Therefore, I lump together in "employees" everyone from the most me-
nial laborer to the chief executive officer.
Some commentators draw sharp distinctions between managers and employees regarding the
need for fiduciary protections. Professor Coffee, for example, believes that managers are espe-
cially vulnerable to expropriation in takeovers. John C. Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers:
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compensation and thus having a palpable interest in the future of the cor-
poration. With regard to the investment in the corporation by employees, a
body of scholarship argues that employees make human capital invest-
ments in the firms for which they work. One of the more compelling of
these arguments posits that employees during the early years of their em-
ployment underprice their services to the firm in return for the implied
promise that during the employees' last years of employment the firm will
repay the employees for this investment of firm-specific human capital
and, accordingly, pay the employee wages above the fair market value of
such late career services. 76
Assuming that the money investors and human capital investors are ra-
tional maximizers, they share an interest in maximizing the value of the
corporation. All other matters being unchanged, these constituencies nor-
mally benefit from any move that increases the total value of the corpora-
tion. Thus, for example, if the corporation invests in a new machine or a
new division or purchases a new subsidiary and the investment is profit-
able, all money investors and human capital investors should benefit from
the purchase.77 This leads to the rather simple, but important, conclusion
that all of these constituencies, as rational maximizers, want managers to
manage the corporation in a way that maximizes the overall value of the
corporation.
On the other hand, as rational maximizers, each of the constituencies
(and, indeed, each of the individual money investors and human capital
investors) wants to appropriate for itself as much of the corporate value as
possible. Thus, for example, rationally maximizing common shareholders
desire a leveraged buyout of "their" company if they are thereby able to
expropriate value from other constituencies, such as preferred sharehold-
ers, creditors, and employees. This claim of expropriation, of course, is at
the heart of many of the classic corporate fiduciary cases, including those
involving voluntary recapitalization that changes the rights of preferred
The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 73-86 (1986) (analyzing the problem of
losing deferred compensation after a takeover). Professor O'Conner, on the other hand, opines
that employees are much more vulnerable to expropriation. Maureen A. O'Connor, Restructur-
ing the Corporation's Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty To Protect Displaced
Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189, 1212-23 (1991).
Anyone considering directors as rational maximizers should read James D. Cox & Harry L.
Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corpo-
rate Cohesion, 48 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (1985).
76. These theories are well explained by Katherine Van Wezel Stone in Policing Employ-
ment Contracts Within the Nexus-of-Contracts Firm, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 353. 363-69 (1993)
[hereinafter Stone, Policing]; Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Employees as Stakeholders Under
State Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 21 STETSON. L. REV. 45, 48-53 (1991) [hereinafter
Stone, Employees as Stakeholders]; and O'Connor, supra note 75, at 1205-07.
77. The value of the residual claimants' investment increases because their income stream
increases; the value of the fixed claimants' investment increases because their fixed stream of
earnings becomes less risky.
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shareholders," leveraged buyouts that reduce the value of the corpora-
tion's debt instruments, 79 and the intra-constituency expropriation that oc-
curs when, for example, majority common shareholders effect an affiliated
merger at a price below the fair value of the affiliate.A0
Managers, for two somewhat different reasons, are in a unique position
in all of this. First, as rational maximizers, managers' first instinct is to
garner as much as possible of the corporate value directly for themselves.
Once managers have attained for themselves as much corporate value as is
possible, their next desire is to appropriate value for the benefit of com-
mon stockholders. The reason managers attempt to promote the interest of
common stockholders is that common stockholders appoint managers, a
factor which makes it in managers' self-interest to please common stock-
holders. Everyone understands that stockholders' "appointment" of man-
agers is somewhat indirect, but, for the purposes of this Article, the point
is simple: as rational maximizers, managers would rather allocate value to
common shareholders than allocate value to preferred shareholders,
creditors, or employees.
The uniqueness of the managers' position is also a result of the fact that
nearly no transaction that affects the absolute or relative wealth of inves-
tors can be accomplished without the involvement of at least some of the
corporate managers. In many instances, for example, statutes require the
approval of directors before such transactions affecting wealth can be ac-
complished. Obvious examples of this include dividend decisions, merg-
ers, sales of assets, and recapitalizations accomplished by amendments to
the articles of incorporation. Even in transactions structured to bypass
managers, such as a tender for the majority of the outstanding common
stock of a company, managers typically take steps that impact the outcome
of the transaction. The most obvious, of course, are defensive tactics that
managers may initiate to fight an unsolicited tender.
Finally, remote constituencies include groups whose well-being is inte-
grally tied to the corporation's success and extends to groups that are so
remote that corporate actions affect them only in a marginal or theoretical
way. If one imagines, for example, a corporation with $100 million in as-
sets that is forced into bankruptcy and liquidation by a stupid management
decision, the identification of remote constituencies becomes easier. Re-
mote constituencies such as the bankrupt corporations suppliers and their
constituencies (employees, suppliers, managers, investors, etc. of the
suppliers) are harmed by the loss of the customer and, in an extreme case,
could be devastated by the loss, depending on the percentages of the sup-
pliers' business that the corporation represented. The community in which
78. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
79. See discussion infra part V.B.
80. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying texi.
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the business was located also suffers as a result. The nation as a whole suf-
fers from the loss of a competitive unit. Indeed, the entire global economy
may suffer, but, of course, at this point the harm becomes nearly or ac-
tually theoretical, and here the problem of breadth becomes most appar-
ent.
The breadth of the protection of fiduciary principles must necessarily
be limited by a perimeter. Although a number of commentators have ar-
gued for expansion of the present perimeter, which now encompasses only
equity investors, little discussion has been generated regarding the appro-
priate outer limits of fiduciary protection for remote constituencies.
IV. PRINCIPLES AND IMPLEMENTATION
A. Society's Fiduciary Principles
The shape of corporate managers' fiduciary obligations should be de-
termined by three principles. The first principle ("Principle Requiring
Corporate Value Maximization") is that managers are obligated to maxi-
mize the value of the corporation. One should note that this principle is
not that managers must maximize the value of shareholders' interests in
the corporation, an application which may approximate the present fiduci-
ary rule.8 Instead, the Principle Requiring Corporate Value Maximization
requires that managers' obligations be measured by reference to the corpo-
ration as a whole and not by reference to a single component of the corpo-
ration, such as the interests of the stockholders.
The second principle ("Principle Prohibiting Wealth Transfers") is that
managers are obligated to refrain from effecting or facilitating inter-
constituency or intra-constituency "wealth transfers," unless the losing in-
vestors have consented to the risk of the particular wealth transfer. 82 A
"wealth transfer" is a redistribution of corporate wealth or value from one
group (or person) to another group (or person). The Principle Prohibiting
Wealth Transfers prohibits managers from taking action that, for example,
transfers wealth from creditors to common stockholders or transfers
wealth from common stockholders to managers themselves. These are ex-
amples of inter-constituency wealth transfers. The Principle Prohibiting
81. Dean Robert Clark states that "from the traditional legal viewpoint, a corporation's di-
rectors and officers have a fiduciary duty to maximize shareholder wealth, subject to numerous
duties to meet specific obligations to other groups affected by the corporation." ROBERT C.
CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 678 (1986).
82. For purposes of this Article, "consent" is assumed to exist if the risk of the event is to
some degree impounded on price. I leave for another day the question of whether such a defini-
tion of "consent" is well founded in moral theory, a subject that is explored and debated in the
following articles: Posner, supra note 18; Coleman, supra note 13, at 531-40; and Dworkin, su-
pra note 66, at 574-79.
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Wealth Transfers also prohibits wealth transfers among members of a sin-
gle constituency (intra-constituency), such as wealth transfers to majority
common stockholders from minority common stockholders. These moves
are permitted, however, if the parties subjected to the wealth transfer con-
sented ex ante to the move.
The proper relationship between the Principle Requiring Corporate
Value Maximization and the Principle Prohibiting Wealth Transfers re-
quires that managers presented with a move that is wealth-enhancing but
that also effects a wealth transfer must, to the extent possible, eliminate
the wealth transfer and then make the move. Thus, managers cannot de-
fend against a charge that they failed to make a wealth-maximizing move
by claiming that the move also involved a wealth transfer, unless managers
show that it was impossible to eliminate the wealth transfer.
The Principle Requiring Corporate Value Maximization and the Prin-
ciple Prohibiting Wealth Transfers are founded on Pareto criteria, since
the principles together require managers to make all Pareto superior
moves. 3 Furthermore, the relationship between the principles, as de-
scribed in this section, requires management to make all Kaldor-Hicks ef-
ficient moves14 and then turn the move into a Pareto superior move by ar-.
ranging compensation from the winners to the losers. Although this sounds
somewhat esoteric and mechanistically complicated, in real life these com-
pensation payments typically should be easy for management to effect.,,
The third principle ("Principle Permitting Gain Allocation") is that
managers are free in their discretion to allocate among constituencies gains
from transactions, except that managers cannot allocate such gains to
themselves. This third principle is likely to be the most controversial and
problematic of the three. On the one hand, some may argue that managers
should be allowed, as an incentive, to participate in the value created in
wealth-enhancing moves. Others may argue with equal vigor the unfair-
ness of permitting managers to allocate all of a particular corporate gain to
a favored constituent, such as common shareholders.
These three principles are meant to provide guidance for courts operating
under traditional, general fiduciary standards, whether the standards are based
on statutory or common law, and for legislatures enacting statutes related to
83. A move is Pareto superior if no one is made worse off by the move and at least one
person is made better off. See MURPHY & COLEMAN, supra note 24, at 182-85.
84. A move is Kaldor-Hicks efficient even if there are losers so long as the winners in the
move could compensate the losers in the move, whether or not such compensation in fact occurs.
See MURPHY & COLEMAN, supra note 24, at 186.
85. Morey W. McDaniel has opined similarly. Morey W. McDaniel, Stockholders and
Stakeholders. 21 STETSON L. REV. 121, 134 n.43 ("[Mlanagers, acting as agents for all partici-
pants, can arrange cheaply, if not costlessly, for the necessary side payments.").
McDaniel's fine works cited in this Article generally reflect views consistent with my own and
helped crystalize my thinking regarding the fiduciary principle that I propose.
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the fiduciary duties of managers. The reasons offered in support of the
principles should be equally compelling to legislatures considering statutes
dealing with managers' fiduciary duties and to courts interpreting manag-
ers' fiduciary obligations under broad standards. Further, as will be
shown, a rational pursuit of the principles requires both judicial and legis-
lative involvement, since as a result of legal process and practical consid-
erations, a particular societal rulemaker (the legislature, for example) may
be superior in a certain instance to another societal rulemaker (courts, for
example)."
B. The Mandatory Application of the Three Principles
Part II of this Article dealt with the matter of whether society should elimi-
nate all mandated fiduciary duties for corporate managers and concluded that
all such mandatory fiduciary duties should not be eliminated.
A similar, but more complex, matter must now be considered in light of
the three principles of fiduciary duties proposed. Specifically, the following
questions need to be answered. First, should the proposed principles be man-
datory in whole, or in part? Second, if only a part of the principles are consid-
ered mandatory, how should society's decisionmakers determine which parts
of the duties are mandatory and which parts may be limited by the parties?
As will be explained, the three fiduciary principles proposed are generally
supported by values widely shared in society and are otherwise good princi-
ples. 7 As a result, the mandatory imposition of the whole of the principles on
corporate managers and corporate constituencies would seem appropriate. An
apparent problem with such an all-inclusive mandatory imposition of the prin-
ciples, however, is that instances arise in which investors and corporate man-
agers for legitimate reasons desire to construct an investment arrangement that
is inconsistent with one of the principles and in which they are fully capable
of evaluating and pricing the investment arrangement. 88
86. Neither the proposed principles nor this Article generally (at least to any significant
extent) deal with the standards of care or allocations of the burdens of proof that are appropriate
when investors claim that managers' violations of the proposed principles entitle them to some ex
post settlement. With regard to such matters, however, the business judgment, proportionality,
and intrinsic fairness tests, at least in a mechanistic matter, will continue to work well.
Thus, if investors claim that a decision of managers to purchase assets, defend against a hostile
takeover, or effect an affiliated merger violates the Principle Requiring Corporate Value Maxi-
mization or violates the Principle Prohibiting Wealth Transfers, courts could (but would not be
required by the proposed principles to) continue to use the business judgment, proportionality,
and intrinsic fairness tests to establish managers' standards of conduct and obligations regarding
the burdens of proof.
87. See discussion infra parts IV.D., I.E., V.
88. In economic terms, to prohibit such parties from agreeing to the desired terms would be
inefficient. Regulators do not generally dispute that economic efficiency is valuable. See supra
note 72 and accompanying text.
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As a way of explaining this dilemma, consider circumstances surround-
ing the construction and exercise of a redemption provision in a preferred
stock contract.89 The exercise of a redemption privilege is contrary to the
best interests of the preferred stockholders who are subjected to the re-
demption, since if interest rates go down and, as a result, a preferred
share of stock is worth more (but for the redemption provision), the pre-
ferred shareholders are better off if the corporate managers do not call the
stock. Managers' exercise of a right of redemption, therefore, is a move
that involves a transfer of wealth away from the preferred stockholders.
The reason managers should not be, and under today's fiduciary rules
are not, required to forego the exercise of the redemption right is that the
preferred stockholders contracted for and are paid to take the risk of re-
demption. In other words, preferred stockholders consented ex ante to the
redemption," and no third-party effects are apparent in the situation. This
leads to the obvious, but highly generalized, conclusion that, at a mini-
mum, any right to opt out of any part of the proposed fiduciary principles
should be predicated on a clear demonstration of consent.
Regulators proffer different formulas to deal with the matter of when
parties should be permitted to opt out of portions of mandatory fiduciary
principles, 9 and Professor John Coffee's treatment of this matter is most
attractive. While Professor Coffee (and, indeed, all of the Regulators)
seeks to preserve the value of economic efficiency by permitting consent-
ing parties to enter into arrangements that advance their own interests, as-
suming, of course, that no overriding third-party effects are present, he
makes the fundamental, and thus predictable, Regulators' point out that
"informational asymmetries and collective action problems [create] reason
to doubt the market's ability to price" terms affecting fiduciary duties.
Professor Coffee doubts the probability, in other words, of satisfactory
levels of bargaining regarding the opting out of fiduciary duties. 92
In addition to doubts regarding the adequacy of bargaining, the idea
that investors would, at least in broad terms, opt out of the protection of
89. Although this problem does not involve an actual violation of the Principle Prohibiting
Wealth Transfers, since the principle as stated permits the parties to consent to wealth transfers,
it nonetheless provides a good example of the relationship between consent and the mandatory
nature of the principles.
90. It is interesting to relate this example to Posner's use of consent and ex ante compensa-
tion in his discussion of the moral justification for the pursuit of wealth maximization by society.
See Posner, supra note 18.
91. Two of the most extensive treatments of this are in Eisenberg, supra note 6, and Cof-
fee, Essay, supra note 6. More generally, see Lucian A. Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom
in Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1820
(1989); Brudney, supra note 6.
92. Eisenberg also recognizes the value of permitting parties to contract in their own per-
ceived best interests, and he attempts to protect that right in the corporate governance area, but
his formula is more rigid than that of Professor Coffee's. See Eisenberg, supra note 6.
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the fiduciary principles proposed here is counterintuitive. If investors en-
tirely opted out of the principle Requiring Corporate Value Maximization
and the principle Prohibiting Wealth Transfers, for example, they would
be saying to managers: "Here is my money for you to manage, but you
are not required to try to increase the value of my investment, and it is
permissible for you to give part of the value of my investment to other in-
vestors." The facial absurdity of such an arrangement makes it highly un-
likely that investors would knowingly consent to such an investment ar-
rangement.
Generally, Professor Coffee proposes opt-out rules designed in part to
ensure that any opting out involves a meaningful ex ante consent of the
parties. Professor Coffee would require courts to find that any deviation
from state-prescribed fiduciary duties is "accurately priced," to ensure that
"shareholders have been compensated" for the additional risk they assume
by the altered fiduciary standards. Thus, he proposes that opting out
should be predicated on a finding that the opt-out provision is "sufficiently
specific and limited in its application that the parties reasonably could ap-
preciate its likely impact. . .. "' Professor Coffee also retains a baseline
mandatory duty that is not subject to any opting out. In his case, he pro-
poses "good faith" as that standard. 4 All of this provides an attractive
model for permissible opting out of the proposed principles, although my
own view differs somewhat from Professor Coffee's.
The Principle Requiring Corporate Value Maximization should be
considered a mandatory rule, except that the parties should be permitted to
consent to any level of care for managers down to, but not including,
gross negligence. Two reasons support limiting the right to opt out at this
level of care. First, an investor's agreeing to a lower standard of care is so
implausible as to make any claim of consent highly suspect. Such an
agreement lowering the standard of care to gross negligence (or lower)
would mean that the investor turns his or her money over to the corporate
manager with the understanding that the manager may manage the money
in a grossly negligent (or more culpable) manner. When one considers the
informational asymmetries and collective action problems described by
Professor Coffee, society should be unwilling to infer that investors opted
for such an arrangement.
The second reason that opting out of the Principle Requiring Corporate
Value Maximization should be limited at the gross negligence level is that
lower standards of care facilitate the under-management of corporate as-
sets to an unwarranted degree. As a general matter, Contractarians are
93. Coffee, Essay, supra note 6, at 1665. Alternatively, Professor Coffee requires that the
provision represent "the substitution of an adequate alternative procedure that the parties rea-




correct to insist that assets, including corporate assets, should be moved
into the hands of productive managers, and any rule that permits managers
to manage corporate assets at the gross negligence level or lower is incon-
sistent with that goal. 95
The prohibition of managers' effecting or facilitating wealth transfers,
which is the heart of the Principle Prohibiting Wealth Transfers, is specifi-
cally made subject to the right of the investors to consent to the risk of the
wealth transfer. Thus the Principle Requiring Corporate Value Maximiza-
tion and the Principle Prohibiting Wealth Transfers are, to differing de-
grees, made subject to opting out through ex ante consent.
Following the lead of Professor Coffee, courts should be most reluctant
to infer that investors consented to changes in the applicability of the
Principle Requiring Corporate Value Maximization and the Principle Pro-
hibiting Wealth Transfers and should require managers to overcome a
strong burden against such opting out. Certainly, Professor Coffee is cor-
rect that such opting out must, at a minimum, be predicated on clear and
specific language dealing with the particular matter. Thus, general lan-
guage normally should be insufficient to opt out.
Admittedly, this approach will require some common law definition
over time, but, in the interim, the pressures are just where they should be.
Managers and other constituencies that stand to benefit from underpriced
opting out terms should be provided with strong incentives to make certain
that any opting out of the principles is clearly and specifically articulated
and subjected to meaningful process and, thus, properly priced. Exposing
managers and such constituencies to the risk that opting out will be inef-
fective is the best possible incentive for proper pricing.
Relatedly, one should not forget that managers control the process by
which such opting out terms are constructed, implemented, and priced.
Managers or their agents typically bear responsibility for drafting the opt-
out provisions, and typically mangers establish the process through which
the corporation or the corporate constituencies "consent" to the opt-out
provisions. Thus, saddling managers with the responsibility for eliminating
market failures in this process is an efficient allocation of responsibility.
Finally, the Principle Permitting Gain Allocation should be considered
entirely a default rule. The pressures in this situation are reversed from those
at work in the Principle Requiring Corporate Value Maximization and the
Principle Prohibiting Wealth Transfers. An agreement by managers and
95. In an economic sense, of course, an efficient allocation of fiduciary duties may occur if
owners and managers agree on a grossly negligent (or lower) standard of fiduciary care. On the
other hand, such an arrangement can have third-party effects, since others in society may be
willing to pay something to avoid such a waste of valuable societal assets. In any event, as de-
scribed above, such an "agreement" between an owner and managers seems so unlikely that it is
explainable only as a failure by the owner to understand the terms of the arrangement.
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common stockholders to forego the benefit of the Principle Permitting
Gain Allocation and to share corporate gains with other constituencies
raises no concern that informational asymmetries and collective action
problems make the level of bargaining suspect. Managers and stockhold-
ers, the constituencies that may be disadvantaged by the rebargaining of
the default rule, are capable of protecting themselves by bargaining.
C. Breadth of the Principles-Remote Constituencies
While it is not difficult to imagine that remote constituencies can be
harmed significantly by the actions of managers and that society may be
sympathetically inclined to provide protections for such groups, 96 courts
would face insuperable complexity if they attempted under general fiduci-
ary standards to apply the Principle Requiring Corporate Value Maximi-
zation and the Principle Prohibiting Wealth Transfers for the protection of
remote constituencies. Suppose, for example, that courts interpreted man-
agers' general fiduciary obligations in a manner that made the Principle
Prohibiting Wealth Transfers protective of remote constituencies. In such a
case, corporate managers would be unable to switch to a more efficient
supplier of raw materials, since the move would not result in a Pareto su-
perior state. The move would produce a loser, the abandoned supplier.
Prohibiting a switch by the corporation to a more efficient supplier, how-
ever, is so antithetical to economic efficiency that no one seems willing to
suggest its appropriateness. Such a rule would also so handcuff manage-
ment that the corporation would be brought to a grinding halt. Manage-
ment cannot run a corporation without adversely affecting someone. Not
only is the idea silly, but also normatively it would be impossible for man-
agers to implement.97
Finally, enforcing the principles on behalf of remote constituencies
would generate impossible problems for courts. For example, consider the
claims of communities and their inhabitants harmed by plant closings.
Identifying, calculating, and managing the thousands of independent and
vastly differing claims that would be generated are clearly beyond any rea-
sonable capability of courts.
To conclude, however, that remote constituencies should have no general,
court-enforced fiduciary right to the protection of the Principle Prohibiting
96. Professors Shleifer and Summers render a compelling description of the impact of a
plant closing on remote constituencies. See Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence H. Summers, The Effect
of Takeover Activity on Corporate Research and Development, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS:
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 33-54 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988).
97. This, of course, is merely a restatement of the often voiced criticism of Pareto stan-
dards: that Pareto criteria are nearly useless in the real world because it is impossible to avoid




Wealth Transfers says nothing about whether we should permit such con-
stituencies to enforce the Principle Requiring Corporate Value Maximiza-
tion, the obligation that managers maximize the value of the corporation.
Assume, for example that managers make a huge and exceedingly stupid
investment that materially reduces the overall value of the corporation. If
the community in which the company is located or the corporation's sup-
pliers suffer as a result of the loss, one may be pressed to explain just why
members of the community or the supplier should not be able to initiate a
derivative suit on behalf of the corporation. This question is more difficult
than the question of whether an inefficient supplier should be protected.
Ultimately, however, courts acting under a general fiduciary standard
should deny remote constituencies the right to enforce the proposed prin-
ciples, including the Principle Requiring Corporate Value Maximization.
As will be described later, money investors and human capital investors
should all have the right to enforce the obligation to maximize the value of
the corporation. Permitting these broad groups such enforcement rights
irovides sufficient incentive to ensure that managers live up to their obli-
gation to maximize the value of the corporation. Permitting a broad range
of additional plaintiffs, such as remote constituencies, to enforce the Prin-
ciple Requiring Corporate Value Maximization would likely add to agency
costs without a corresponding increase in the quality of managers.
The harshness of this position, which is that managers should have no
general, court-enforced fiduciary duties to remote constituencies, should
not be overlooked, however. Certainly one feels sorry for a community,
suppliers, and constituencies who, through no fault of their own, are ad-
versely affected by the mismanagement of corporation. To make matters
worse, by excluding remote constituencies from generalized fiduciary
protection, managers, acting on behalf of the money investors and human
capital investors, are not only permitted, but also required, to take every
possible advantage of these remote constituencies. The obligation to in-
crease the value of the "corporation," which now consists of the money
investors and the human capital investors only, compels managers to make
every possible move that shifts wealth from any remote constituency to
money investors and human capital investors.
The proper response to these concerns requires legislative considera-
tion. Thus, while it would be impossible or inappropriate for courts acting
under general fiduciary standards to protect remote constituencies from
losses of wealth that are caused by management decisions or mismanage-
ment, a legislature could choose to deal statutorily with such losses. For
example, a legislature could pass a plant closing bill that would require a
six-month notice to the community before a plant could close. As another
example, a legislature could require companies to pay closing fees to
communities affected by closings. Each of these examples represents an
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attempt to deal ex ante with the losses of remote constituencies-losses that
are caused by the pursuit of wealth maximization for investors and that are
impossible for courts to process and remedy under general fiduciary stan-
dards.
Each of these solutions is subject to criticism, of course. Contractarians
would naturally claim that such laws are economically inefficient, and
certainly such remedies represent inexact compensation for losses suffered
by the remote constituencies. Nonetheless, legislatures could conclude that
economic efficiency is trumped by other values and that an ex ante com-
pensation schedule, while inexact, is the best society can do in the situa-
tion. In fact, a legislature may conclude that uncompensated losses visited
on communities in such cases are unacceptable.
The point here is not to endorse these or any such measures, and the
Article purposefully avoids any such endorsement. Instead, the point is
that the concerns of society for remote constituencies can only be imple-
mented through legislative action. If legislatures were to conclude that re-
mote constituencies are deserving of protection from such losses, then
clearly articulated ex ante rules that cal be priced by the market may be
attractive solutions, even if such solutions are necessarily imperfect.
D. A Defense of the Principle Requiring Corporate Value Maximization
and the Principle Prohibiting Wealth Transfers
The Principle Requiring Corporate Value Maximization and the Prin-
ciple Prohibiting Wealth Transfers are based on Pareto criteria, which are
demonstrably attractive to society. Accordingly, while the Principle Re-
quiring Corporate Value Maximization and the Principle Prohibiting
Wealth Transfers can be defended on numerous grounds, the principles
rest most comfortably on broadly shared societal values." Although one is
able to find cases and statutes that are inconsistent with the principles (and,
indeed, part of the purpose of this Article is to deal with these inconsis-
tencies), the fact that legislatures and courts persistently return to these
fundamental principles reflects a widely held view that it is inappropriate
for corporate managers to fail to maximize the value of the corporation or
engage in inter-constituency or intra-constituency wealth transfers.
Manifestations of society's commitment to these principles are easy to
find.' For example, the obligation of corporate managers to maximize the
98. Like Judge Calabresi, I generally am willing to pursue "goals that are apparently ad-
hered to by most people in society, even if with no great consistency." Calabresi, supra note 19,
at 556.
99. The examples in this section are intended to be more general and thus are primarily
limited to money investors. In part V.C., human capital investors are considered specifically
and, at that point, arguments are offered for the view that manifested societal values support the
extension of the principles to human capital investors.
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value of the corporation has an obvious and strong family resemblance to
the long-standing rule that corporate managers must operate corporations
in the best interests of the owners of corporations."° While over the years
society has imposed certain limitations on these obligations and disagree-
ments have at times erupted about the standards of care to which we hold
various managers, no court or legislature has seriously considered aban-
doning this fundamental obligation.
The Principle Requiring Corporate Value Maximization is, perhaps,
even more closely related to the right to bring a derivative action in order
to remedy harms to the corporation from mismanagement. Although de-
rivative actions normally can be pursued only by shareholders,' ° any re-
covery becomes a corporate asset and thus is available for claims of any
constituency, including creditors and employees. Courts, in fact, have
gone to some lengths to ensure that constituencies other than common
stockholders are the beneficiaries of derivative actions. 02 The availability
of these derivative rights is consistent with an obligation for corporate
managers to maximize the total value of the corporation.
The Principle Requiring Corporate Value Maximization is also related
to the bankruptcy rights of the constituencies. If a corporation is subjected
to a bankruptcy proceeding, the trustee is required to gather all corporate
assets, including any causes of action that the corporation may have. Thus,
if managers have breached their fiduciary duties by not maximizing the
value of the corporation for the owners, that claim passes to the trustee,
who enforces it against managers. As in a derivative suit, the recovery
from this claim becomes an asset of the bankrupt estate, which asset is
then available to satisfy the claims of all claimants according to bank-
ruptcy law. 103
100. CLARK, supra note 81, at 678 (1986) ("[Flrom the traditional legal viewpoint, a corpo-
ration's directors and officers have a fiduciary duty to maximize shareholder wealth .... ");
Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 256 (7th Cir.), rev'd, 481 U.S. 69 (1986)
(Judge Posner states that a director's obligation is "stockholder wealth maximization.").
101. See, e.g., RMBCA § 7.40(a) (1994). But see WILLIAM CARY & MELVIN A. EIS-
ENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 936 & n.3 (1988) (stating that "a creditor
... ordinarily has no right to bring a derivative action" but then stating in footnote three that
"the rule is not entirely clear").
102. Courts have developed derivative suit rules that protect creditors. For example, courts
have been most reluctant to permit a pro rata recovery in a derivative action but, instead, have
concluded that the full corporate loss must be awarded to the corporation. See HARRY G. HENN,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 373 (2d ed. 1970). One court explained the basis
for the rule as follows:
One of the reasons why courts of equity have not allowed direct proportionate recover-
ies in stockholders' derivative suits has been that the recovery is an asset of the corpo-
ration, and its creditors have first claim upon it; and that to award such recovery direct
to the stockholders leaving any creditors unpaid, would be fraudulent as to them.
Liken v. Shaffer, 64 F. Supp. 432, 441 (Iowa N.D. 1946).
103. See generally DANIEL R. COWANS, II BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 169-72 (6th
ed. 1994).
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Society's aversion to corporate wealth transfers, an aversion which un-
dergirds the second principle, is similarly visible through court decisions
and statutes. As examples, statutes that limit the payment of dividends to
the amount of a company's earned surplustu' and the rules that prohibit an
insolvent corporation from paying dividends'05 are designed to control the
transfer of wealth from creditors to shareholders. Fraudulent conveyance
statutes,106 the "fairness" limitation imposed on the rebargaining of rights
under old Chapter 10 reorganizations, 17 and the limitations imposed by the
Trust Indenture Act on rebargaining the terms of a qualified indenture01 s
are other examples of legislative rules that are (or were) designed to limit
expropriation of creditors' wealth.
The rules of society also protect preferred stockholders from the ex-
propriation of their wealth by other constituencies. As was described in
part II, courts, through the exercise of their general fiduciary powers, and
legislatures, through the enactment of appraisal statutes, impose limitations
on the concessions that can be extracted from preferred stockholders in
single-company recapitalizations. 109
Similarly, common law and statutes limit wealth transfers within a sin-
gle constituency. Thus, as was previously discussed, minority common
stockholders involved in an affiliated merger are protected against expro-
priation by the terms of the intrinsic fairness test and appraisal rights."10
Over the years, therefore, society has affirmed its commitment to
manager obligations' to maximize the value of the corporation and refrain
from wealth transfers. Admittedly, society has not always treated these
104. See, e.g., MBCA § 45 (1991) (limiting payment of dividends to the amount of "earned
surplus"). Even the RMBCA §§ 6.40 and 1.40(6) contain a similar, although significantly less
restrictive, provision.
105. See, e.g., RMBCA § 6.40(c)(1) (1994).
106. See, e.g., UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT, 7A U.L.A. 652 (1984); see generally
Robert C. Clark, The Duties of the Corporate Debtor to its Creditors, 90 HARV. L. REV. 505
(1977). For an outstanding piece dealing with the problems of fraudulent conveyancing in the
context of highly leveraged transactions, see Emily L. Sherwin, Creditors' Rights Against Par-
ticipants in a Leveraged Buyout, 72 MINN. L. REV. 449 (1988).
107. Prior to the Bankruptcy Act Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549
(1978) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1978)), bondholders in a Chapter X re-
organization were protected by the absolute priority rule, which required that the consideration
they received in the reorganization be "fair and equitable." See, e.g., Walter J. Blum, The Law
and Language of Corporate Reorganization, 17 U. CHI. L. REV. 565, 570-91 (1950). Although
the 1978 Act changed the standard, it retained a limitation for the protection of bondholders. For
an excellent discussion of this, see Victor Brudney, Corporate Bondholders and Debtor Oppor-
tunism: In Bad Times and Good, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1821, 1828-29 (1992).
108. Security Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1994) (providing that an inden-
ture cannot, unless unanimous permission is granted, permit a rebargaining of the right to receive
principal or interest, except that interest may be postponed for up to three years by approval of
75% of the principal amount).
109. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
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matters with consistent rules and remedies, and thus, for example, today
the black letter law is that managers owe no generalized fiduciary duties to
a large portion of money investors (i.e., creditors) or to human capital in-
vestors. Nonetheless, society at a more fundamental level has been unwill-
ing to subject creditors and human capital investors to unfettered bargain-
ing and has imposed significant protections for the benefit of such groups.
A second reason to pursue the Principle Requiring Corporate Value
Maximization and the Principle Prohibiting Wealth Transfers is that they
render good results. The principles protect legitimate expectations of in-
vestors, encourage maximum utilization of assets, promote fairness, and
soften the hard edges of capitalism.
Regarding the expectations of investors, it is admittedly difficult to
prove that those who invest money or human capital in a corporation price
their investment based upon a subjective expectation that the managers of
the corporation will operate the corporation in a way that maximizes its
value and that the managers will refrain from subjecting the investors to
wealth expropriations. Nonetheless, most investors appear to harbor es-
sentially those expectations."' Returning to a point made earlier in this
Article, contrary expectations would mean investors are saying to manag-
ers: "Here is my investment for you to manage. I do not expect you to try
to increase the value of my investment, and you may give to any other in-
vestor part or all of the value of my investment." It is hard to imagine that
risk-averse investors would select such an investment arrangement. "2
The principles also encourage the productive utilization of assets since,
for example, the principles prohibit corporate managers from significantly
mismanaging corporate assets. Contractarians, of course, disputing the
value of such a rule, claim that society should deploy assets in economi-
cally efficient ways and that economic efficiency is best achieved without
mandatory rules.
In this regard, however, an economically inefficient allocation occurs
only to the extent that the mandatorily imposed terms differ from the bar-
gain that investors would strike with managers if contracting costs were
zero. As discussed above, that fully informed investors would ever
broadly elect out of the principles is not clear. In any event, even if the
mandatorily imposed terms are different from those particular parties may
111. Some may argue that certain of today's investors, such as employees and creditors,
have been so abused by managers over the years that investors expect only the most aggressive
and selfish conduct from managers. If, in fact, this is the case, society should be concerned.
112. Subjective expectations, of course, can be altered by more complete information, and
thus one may be uneasy in defending a particular fiduciary formula by reference to such ephem-
eral expectations. As described earlier, however, informational asymmetries, contracting diffi-
culties, and the nearly bizarre nature of the resulting arrangements among the parties should
make one most suspicious of claims that investors accepted and priced no, or insignificant, fidu-
ciary protections, from managers.
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choose, the only impact of imposing mandatory fiduciary duties on man-
agers is that managers must sell (but will receive compensation for provid-
ing) more fiduciary duties than they otherwise would like and investors
must buy (and will have to pay for) more duties than they otherwise would
like. This result involves no major compromise either to economic effi-
ciency or one's exercise of his or her personal autonomy and, in light of
contracting difficulties among the parties, seems to be a sensible way to
reduce the risk of undermanagement of corporate assets.
Finally, the Principle Prohibiting Wealth Transfers is supported by
considerations of fairness and by the need to eliminate indecent managerial
incentives and to soften the hard edges of capitalism, all of which can best
be understood in light of today's situation. Today, fiduciary rules gener-
ally require managers to act only in the best interests of stockholders and
not in the best interests of other constituencies." 3 As a result, managers
are now permitted, and as rational maximizers have an economic incen-
tive, to expropriate the wealth of employees and creditors in order to
benefit shareholders and themselves." 4 Thus, in today's world, the incen-
tive for managers is to lurk about, attempting to create or find and then
exploit market imperfections and thus expropriate the wealth of disadvan-
taged creditors and employees." 5 In short, managers today have an eco-
nomic incentive to create losers. The economic drubbing of bondholders,
who were subjected to unanticipated highly leveraged transactions in the
1980s and, from years gone by, preferred shareholders, who were sub-
jected to unanticipated managerial conduct and recapitalizations, are ex-
amples of such actions by managers.
Implicit in all of these discussions is the notion that the instrumental
goal of economic efficiency and the more fundamental goals of maximiza-
tion of utility or personal autonomy are not the only goals worth pursuing
by society. Fairness and decency must be accommodated and promoted by
society and, in the cases of the Principle Requiring Corporate Value
Maximization and the Principle Prohibiting Wealth Transfers, those values
113. See generally CLARK, supra note 81 (directors and officers have a fiduciary duty to
maximize shareholder wealth); Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 256 (7th
Cir.), rev'd, 481 U.S. 69 (1986) (directors' obligation is "stockholder wealth maximization").
114. Obviously, managers have an economic incentive to expropriate the wealth of non-
stockholders (and others). Regarding today's legal rules, it is an interesting question whether
managers are free to expropriate nonstockholder value for themselves or are required by their fi-
duciary obligations to stockholders to turn over all such expropriations to stockholders.
115. The suggestion of the Contractarians to eliminate all fiduciary protections leaves the
economic incentives unchanged, since in all events managers have economic incentives to create
and exploit market failures for the benefit of themselves and voting stockholders. If, under a
Contractarian regime, managers were to opt out of their fiduciary duties to stockholders, then
managers' ability to construct and exploit market failures in furtherance of wealth transfers fa-
vorable to themselves and voting stockholders would be unconstrained by legal criteria.
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predominate over any minor compromises in efficiency, utility, or auton-
omy generated by the principles.' 6
Other arguments against principles one and two are also unpersuasive.
For instance, it is unpersuasive to argue that the principles, which will ex-
pand fiduciary protections to constituencies beyond stockholders, will
subject managers to the impossible task of serving two masters.' 7 In the
first place, managers already serve multiple masters, including majority
common shareholders, minority common shareholders, and preferred
shareholders. As any student of corporate finance knows, those constitu-
encies can have diametrically opposed interests. Second, a requirement
that a fiduciary make allocative decisions is neither unmanageable nor un-
fair. Society constantly requires this of fiduciaries (and others), and the
most obvious example of a fiduciary entrusted with allocative tasks is a
judge. Managers (or judges) do, of course, need sensible and intelligible
allocative rules, which, it is hoped, are offered in this Article.
Some may argue that the prohibition against wealth transfers discour-
ages beneficial acquisitions, an argument best explained by the following
example. Assume that the present value of X Co.'s assets is $100 and the
value is split evenly between creditors and common stockholders. X Co.
purchases an operating subsidiary for $20 and pays for the purchase by is-
suing new debt. Because managers are able to utilize the new assets effi-
ciently, the move increases the total value of X Co.'s assets to $140 (this
includes the pre-existing value of the X Co. and the newly acquired sub-
sidiary, plus $20 in synergy resulting from the purchase), but the in-
creased leverage reduces the value of the old creditors' interest to $40
116. Most of us, assumedly, reject the notion that any single value or goal must drive all
decisions but, instead, believe that more than one value is worth promoting. This point is made
by Murphy and Coleman as they contrast utilitarianism and Kantianism: "[Bloth traditions do.
seem highly plausible to most of us. We are inclined to think that each has an important per-
spective to offer on ethics, even if we are unsure of just how to integrate them both into one co-
herent overall moral vision." MURPHY & COLEMAN, supra note 24, at 79.
For example, many of us may believe that one's exercise of personal autonomy may entitle
him or her to burn a building that he or she owns. Perhaps the act is a form of protest against an
unjust war; perhaps the owner simply feels the building is too ugly to continue standing. If,
however, the building contains a Van Gogh painting or the only copy of an unpublished Mozart
sonata, which, let us assume, the owner is unwilling to sell at any price but intends to burn with
the building, some may conclude that society has a right in such a case to intervene to prevent
the owner from burning his or her building or the art work. Perhaps one may base such a re-
straint on utilitarian notions and conclude that the utility to the owner generated by burning the
building and its contents is less that the loss of utility to society from the destruction of such a
treasure. Perhaps we articulate the reasons for protecting art treasures differently, and perhaps
we even conclude (I would not) that personal autonomy trumps in this case and that the owner
may burn the building and the painting. The point is, however, that most of us in looking at the
problem would not fail to see that values other than personal autonomy must at least be consid-
ered in arriving at a solution to the question.
117. Thomas R. Hurst & Larry .1. McGuinness, The Corporation, The Bondholder and Fi-
duciary Duties, 10 J.L. & COM. 187, 205 (1991).
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(i.e., the stockholders' value increases to $80, but the old creditors' value
decreases to $40; the value of the new debt is assumed to be $20). The
move is value-maximizing, as demonstrated by the increased market price
of the X Co.'s assets after the acquisition and, accordingly, should be en-
couraged. The problem, however, is that the move involves a wealth
transfer and thus apparently violates the Principle Prohibiting Wealth
Transfers.
The proposed principles deal with this dilemma by a requirement that
managers make all value-enhancing moves, such as acquiring the subsidi-
ary, if it is possible to avoid the wealth transfer by side payments or other
realignments among the investors. Stated otherwise, the requirement is
that managers must make all moves that are Kaldor-Hicks efficient and
then turn those moves into Pareto superior moves (to the extent that the
moves are not already Pareto superior).
This requirement is especially attractive, since managers usually are in
a perfect position to turn a Kaldor-Hicks efficient move into a Pareto su-
perior move with little or no cost." 8 For example, in our hypothetical
case, managers can easily eliminate the wealth transfer by increasing the
interest rate on the old debt sufficiently to pay the creditors for the added
risk resulting from the additional leverage. 9
118. See, e.g., McDaniel, supra note 85, at 134 n.43 ("[Mlanagers, acting as agents for all
participants, can arrange cheaply, if not costlessly, for the necessary side payments.").
119. Managers faced with a prohibition against wealth transfers but nonetheless acting as ra-
tional maximizers normally would seem inclined to acquire the subsidiary described in the text, even
if managers were not legally required to do so. Managers' self-interest prompts them to please
common stockholders, because managers are appointed by common stockholders. Since stockholders
would not be pleased if they were denied participation in the acquisition of the subsidiary, managers
would take steps to complete the acquisition, which, in the face of a prohibition against wealth trans-
fers, would require managers to eliminate the transfer of wealth away from creditors.
In certain instances, however, the interests of managers are aligned with creditors instead of
common stockholders, see, e.g., Coffee, supra note 10, at 1519-21, necessitating an affirmative
duty on managers that they convert a Kaldor-Hicks efficient move into a Pareto superior move in-
stead of resisting the wealth-enhancing move on the grounds that the move also involves a wealth
transfer. Consider, for example, a highly leveraged bid for a target, which bid may be wealth-
enhancing as a total matter but at the same time, because of the new leverage, may depress the total
value of the target's public debt. If managers were not required to convert a Kaldor-Hicks efficient
move into a Pareto superior move, managers might, in their own self-interest, resist such a bid,
since the successful bid may cost managers their jobs. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klauser, Anti-
takeover Provisions in Bonds: Bondholder Protection or Management Entrenchment?, 40 UCLA Lf
REV. 931, 948-50 (1993) (pointing out that both managers and creditors may oppose a takeover, al-
though managers oppose the takeover because of the potential loss of their jobs, while creditors op-
pose only the additional leverage).
Not only have commentators argued that at times managers' interests parallel interests of credi-
tors, but also commentators have argued that managers' undiversified human capital investment in
the corporation generates in managers a risk aversion that is more like that of creditors and thus less
in line with the level of risk aversion of the common stockholders. As a result, managers may be
disinclined to take on the additional debt in our hypothetical or to make the more risky investment,
even if the investment increases the total value of the corporation. Regarding the risk aversion of
managers, see Alison G. Anderson, Conflicts of Interest: Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate
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One final argument against the principles, specifically the Principle Pro-
hibiting Wealth Transfers, is worth considering. Some argue that it would be
unfair to stockholders now to extend to other constituencies protection from
wealth transfers, since it would involve a midstream correction that robs
stockholders of part of the value of their bargain. 120 In essence, the argument
is that stockholders have, through higher interest rates or other favorable
terms, paid for the right to engage in wealth transfers and now to deny them
that right would be unjust.
This argument fails definitionally, however. If, in fact, the risk of the
wealth-diminishing move were priced at the time the investment was sold by
the company, the Principle Prohibiting Wealth Transfers would not prohibit
the move, since the Principle Prohibiting Wealth Transfers prohibits moves
that diminish an investor's wealth only if the losing group of investors did
not consent, and thus were not paid, to assume the risk of such a transaction.
As a result, enforcing the Principle Prohibiting Wealth Transfers would
prohibit only the exploitation of an unpriced risk or, stated alternatively, the
exploitation of a market failure. This, then, eliminates any claim that impos-
ing a prohibition against wealth transfers would result in a windfall for
constituencies such as bondholders.
E. A Defense of the Principle Permitting Gain Allocation
The third proposed principle of corporate fiduciary duties is that manag-
ers are to be free to allocate gains in their discretion among corporate con-
stituencies, except that management may not allocate to themselves. Of the
principles proposed, this principle is the most problematic as a matter of
theory and may be the most controversial politically."'
Unlike the situation with the Principle Requiring Corporate Value
Maximization and Principle Prohibiting Wealth Transfers, broad manifesta-
tions of societal support for the idea of allowing managers to allocate corpo-
rate gains in their sole discretion (except to themselves) are difficult to find.
In fact, little authority of any sort is available regarding the appropriate allo-
cation of gains among corporate constituencies."'
Structure, 25 UCLA L. REV. 738 (1977-78); Reiner H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strate-
gies and the Cost of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857 (1994).
120. Hurst & McGuinness, supra note 117, at 202-04.
121. See McDaniel, supra note 85, at 136 (recognizing the potential for controversy in rules
governing the allocation of gains).
122. McDaniel says that Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.. 506 A.2d 173
(Del. 1986), "suggests that stockholders must share in any division of net gains and firther that
any benefits received by other stakeholders must be 'rationally related' to the benefits received
by stockholders." Id. at 135-36.
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Even at the intra-constituency level, one finds conflicting signals re-
garding the allocation of gains.' 23 For example, regarding the allocation of
gains among common stockholders, appraisal statutes, although a bit am-
biguous, seem to permit majority stockholders to grab all corporate gains
for themselves in mergers and other transactions involving organic corpo-
rate changes. 24 On the other hand, one finds support in case law for some
obligation to share gains at the intra-constituency level. In Levin v. The
Great Western Sugar Co., 15 for example, the Third Circuit held that in an
affiliated merger the minority shareholders "are entitled to a proportionate
benefit in the merged corporation."' 26 Similarly, near the end of the long
and tortured trail of Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co. ,17 the Seventh Circuit,
in constructing a remedy for a proxy violation in an affiliated merger case,
also indicated that majority shareholders would not be permitted to grab
all the synergy in an affiliated merger.
While it is difficult to base the Principle Permitting Gain Allocation on
societal manifestations, a rule allowing managers discretion to allocate
gains is supported on other grounds. First of all, such a rule is relatively
efficient, since the complexities of allocative formulas make them impos-
sible, or at least cost-prohibitive, for managers to apply in the real world.
Assume, for example, that the applicable allocation formula requires
that gains be allocated among investors according to each investor's pro
rata investment in the corporation. 28 Each management decision, in that
case, would have to be preceded by a determination of the present values
of all investments of each constituency, a measure of the anticipated gain,
an estimation of the way the gain will fall among the various constituen-
cies, and, finally, if the gain falls disproportionately, the steps can be
taken to allocate the gain on a pro rata basis. Such requirements are un-
workable for managers." 9
123. This is not to imply that the same rule regarding the discretion to allocate gain should
apply at the intra-constituency level as applies at the inter-constituency level. Different consid-
erations may exist in the two situations. A discussion of the obligation to share gains at the intra-
constituency level is beyond the scope of this Article and accordingly left for another day.
124. Under the MBCA, stockholders dissenting from the terms of a merger, for example, were
entitled to receive "fair value" for their stock, but such fair value excluded "any appreciation or depre-
ciation in anticipation of such corporate action unless such exclusion would be inequitable." MBCA §
81(a)(3) (1991). The RMBCA uses essentially the same language. RMBCA § 13.01(3) (1994).
125. 406 F.2d 1112 (3d Cir. 1969).
126. Id. at 1117.
127. 552 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922, reh'g denied, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977).
128. McDaniel, whose work is both admirable and compelling, suggests a requirement that
gains be shared with bondholders, although he states that "[a]n equal division of gain between
bondholders and stockholders per dollar invested would lack a rational basis because a firm's
stock is relatively more risky than its bonds." See McDaniel, supra note 58, at 257. He suggests
a permissive allocation of gains to other constituencies. See McDaniel, supra note 85, at 136.
129. Requiring managers to allocate gains according to such a formula is much more com-
plex than requiring managers to avoid wealth transfers. For example, moves by managers that
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Even allocative formulas that appear simple and manageable contain
substantial complexities. For example, one rule that may be attractive to
some and that sounds simple to apply is a rule that requires all gains to be
allocated to common stockholders. This apparently simple formula, how-
ever, contains significant application difficulties for managers. Again, an
example is helpful.
Assume that managers operating under such an allocative formula pur-
chase a new machine that adds substantially to the profit of the company.
Although any net profits or earned surplus generated from the investment
is allocated to the common stockholders, the increased earnings also in-
crease (at least to some degree) the value of the investments of the fixed
claimants. This increased value for the fixed claimants results from the
fact that those parts of the earnings stream servicing the company's pre-
ferred stock and debt become safer, an effect that increases the present
value of those parts of income streams. A portion of the gain from the in-
vestment, therefore, is allocated (albeit without specific action by the man-
agers) to constituencies other than the common stockholders.
For management to take steps to ensure that all gains from all such
transactions are allocated only to common stockholders would be difficult,
and thus costly, or perhaps impossible. Literally, each management deci-
sion would have to be evaluated to determine whether there is gain, and
then steps would have to be taken to make sure that only shareholders rec-
ognized gain. The complexity and costs of such decisionmaking are appar-
ent and would be stifling to the efficient management of the corporation.
Nonetheless, the idea of allocating all or nearly all of corporate gains to
junior equity is attractive. 30 First, such a result approximates the mani-
fested expectations of the parties. Common stockholders, as residual
claimants, expect and generally contract (although perhaps imperfectly) to
receive nearly all corporate gains; that is the essence of their arrangement
with the corporation and its other constituencies. As a corollary, fixed
claimants agree to receive only the very limited gains that result from
changes in the capitalization rate applicable to their fixed stream of earn-
ings, changes which most typically result from a general shift in interest
decrease the value of creditors' investments in the company 'can be identified by reference to the
market, either an external and active market or an inferred market. McDaniel also finds that a
determination "of Pareto efficiency between bondholders and stockholders is a far simpler task"
than allocating gains between the two constituencies. He believes that the "stock market and
bond market provide ready answers" to the question of whether a move was Pareto superior.
McDaniel, supra note 58, at 257.
130. The proposal of permitting managers to allocate gains is based to a significant degree
on inferred consent. I am prepared to infer that fixed claimants manifest only the most limited
expectations to share in corporate gains. By selecting an investment with a fixed return, such in-
vestors consent not to share in corporate gains, at least not to any significant degree. Regarding
consent as a moral justification, see generally Posner, supra note 18.
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rates or an increase in the safety of the portion of the company's income
stream against which they have claims.' 3
The second reason for allocating all, or nearly all, gains to common
stockholders is that it encourages moves that are economically efficient
and thus usually beneficial to society. 32 Corporate transactions typically
require the approval either of common stockholders or the corporate man-
agers who were appointed by common stockholders and thus want to
please common stockholders. Allocating gains to stockholders encourages
stockholders and managers, acting as rational maximizers, to undertake
profitable, and thus efficient, transactions.'33
If one is convinced that allocating most, or all, corporate gains to
common stockholders is sound but that mandatory allocation formulas are
unworkable, then permitting managers discretion regarding the allocation
of gains becomes attractive. The reason is that managers, as rational
maximizers acting without an imposed standard, will be inclined to allo-
cate nearly all corporate gains to common stockholders (assuming always
that managers cannot allocate such gains to themselves). They will effect
such an allocation in order to please common stockholders, who appoint
them as managers. At the same time, managers are unlikely to engage in
inefficient tactics to take every gain for stockholders but, instead, are
likely to permit a certain amount of efficient slippage. Thus, in the exam-
pie above involving the gain to fixed claimants from a profitable invest-
ment, managers would be unlikely to pursue such small gains on behalf of
stockholders but would, instead, allow such gains to go to fixed claimants.
Managers, therefore, should be left unconstrained regarding the alloca-
tion of corporate gains, except they should be prohibited to allocate gains
to themselves. Such managerial discretion avoids costly and essentially
unworkable rules and results in an attractive allocation of corporate
gains.4
131. McDaniel disagrees. Because "in bad times stakeholders must share in the losses," he
reasons that "in good times stakeholders should be able to share in the gains." McDaniel supra
note 85, at 135.
132. Obviously, such transactions are also encouraged by the Principle Requiring Corporate
Value Maximization, which requires managers to make all moves that increase the value of the
corporation. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91
YALE L.J. 698, 710 (1982).
133. The greatest incentive for value-maximizing transactions, of course, would come if the
respective decisionmaker were allowed to keep all the gain. This proposition leads to the notion
that managers should be able to keep all corporate gains, an idea I reject because it conflicts so
fundamentally with the fiduciary concept.
134. No reason exists to fear that managers generally will allocate inappropriate amounts of
gain to constituencies other than common stockholders, although such fears have been voiced.
See McDaniel, supra note 85, at 136.
The point made by commentators, that the interests of managers are often more aligned with
creditors than stockholders, does not lead to a conclusion that unfettered managers will allocate
gains to bondholders. While such an alignment of interests may affect investment decisions
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V. APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES TO SELECTED MATTERS
A. Introduction
The general defense of the proposed fiduciary principles in part IV of
this Article left untreated numerous issues regarding the specific applica-
tions of the principles to particular investors or situations. While discuss-
ing all such issues is impossible, it is appropriate to deal with some of the
more important or instructive applications of the principles. Such particu-
larized discussions permit a better explanation of the reasoning underlying
the expansion of the principles to the specific constituency or situation and
demonstrate, it is hoped, the beneficial effects of the principles. The dis-
cussions also will show that a full implementation of the principles by so-
ciety requires both legislative and court involvement.
B. Creditors
Presently, managers owe no fiduciary duties to creditors of corpora-
tions.t35 This rule continues in nearly all situations and jurisdictions, even
(managers and creditors tend to be more risk-averse than shareholders, and thus managers may
make investment decisions more agreeable to bondholders than stockholders) and decisions re-
garding defensive tactics (managers and creditors may consider it to be in their best interests to
resist highly leveraged acquisitions of the company, even if the acquisition is in the best interests
of stockholders), such ephemeral alignments provide no incentives for managers to allocate gains
to bondholders, for example. See generally supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
135. The rule is long-standing that creditors generally have no right to enforce directly man-
agement's fiduciary obligations. See, e.g, HENRY W. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 184 (rev.
ed. 1946) ("Creditors have no direct right of action against directors or officers for mismanage-
ment ... by the better view."). Examples of cases supporting this position include Nuclear
Corp. of Am. v. Hale, 355 F. Supp. 193 (Tex. N.D. 1973); Skinner v. Hulsey, 138 So. 769
(Fla. 1931); Confick v. Houston Civic Opera Ass'n, 99 S.W.2d 382, 385 (Tex. 1936)
("Directors are not personally liable to creditors for mismanagement, or for waste of assets ex-
cept on proof of the commission of such fraud."); Equitable Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Inland
Printing Co., 484 P.2d 162 (Utah 1971); Anderson v. Bundy, 171 S.E. 501 (Va. 1933); Wheel-
ing Kitchen Equip. Co. v. R. & R. Sewing Center, Inc., 179 S.E.2d 587 (W. Va. 1971); Inter-
Ocean Cas. Co. v. Lecony Smokeless Fuel Co., 17 S.E.2d 51 (W. Va. 1941). See also the cases
cited in RALPH J. BAKER & WILLIAM L. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS
610 (3d ed. 1959).
Similarly, creditors generally have not been permitted to enforce fiduciary claims against man-
agement derivatively in the right of the corporation. See, e.g., RMBCA § 7.41(a) (1994)
(predicating the right to institute a derivative suit on one's having been a "shareholder of the
corporation when the transaction complained of occurred"). A similar position is taken in
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, II PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 7.02 (1994).
Again, this is a long-standing general rule. See BALLANTINE, supra, at 351.
Courts have used various reasons for not extending fiduciary protection to creditors, reasons
including that management is not a trustee for creditors, Skinner, 138 So. at 770 ("It is difficult
to perceive upon what principle a director of a corporation can be considered a trustee of its
creditors."); Whitfield v. Kern, 192 A. 48, 55 (N.J. 1937) (stating that management is not the
agent for creditors).
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though some contrary authority has been generated over the years, 3 6 and
even though some commentators have argued vigorously in favor of ex-
panding the protection of fiduciary duties to include creditors,'37 a line of
argument that appears to have intensified recently. 1
38
To a large extent, this heightened interest in creditors is due to the nu-
merous 3 9 and widely publicized1 40 highly leveraged acquisitions of the
136. See, e.g., Swinney v. Keebler Corp., 329 F. Supp. 216 (D.S.C. 1971). Swinney is one
of the most intriguing, and the most overlooked, of the cases indicating that corporate managers
owe fiduciary duties to creditors. Although the Fourth Circuit reversed the lower court's holding
that creditors could recover for the breach of fiduciary duties, Swinney v. Keebler Corp., 480
F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1973), the reversal was based on the appellate court's determination that the
fiduciary had acted reasonably in the circumstances. The appellate court did not reject the right
of creditors to enforce fiduciary obligations and stated that "if the sellers of control are in a po-
sition to foresee the likelihood of fraud on the corporation, including its creditors . . . or on the
remaining stockholders, at the hands of the transferee, their fiduciary duty imposes a positive
duty to investigate. ... Id. at 578 (citations omitted). Other cases indicating that creditors may
be owed some sort of fiduciary duty include Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); United
States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd mem. sub nom Maryland v. United
States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983); Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981); West-
ern Producers Coop. v. Great Western United Corp., 613 P.2d 873 (Colo. 1980); Steinberg v.
Blaine, 17 S.W.2d 286, 288 (Ark. 1929)' Johnson v. Coleman, 20 S.W.2d 186 (Ark. 1929);
Anthony v. Jeffress, 90 S.E. 414 (N.C. 1916); W. H. Elliot & Sons Co. v. Gotthardt, 305 F.2d
544 (1st Cit. 1962); Goodwin v. Whitener, 138 S.E.2d 232 (N.C. 1964); Ford Motor Credit
Co. v. Minges, 473 F.2d 918 (4th Cir. 1973) (applying North Carolina law); Underwood v.
Stafford, 155 S.E.2d 211 (N.C. 1967). Clearly, however, the substantial majority rule is that
creditors are owed no fiduciary duties. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore &
O.R.R. Co., 680 F.2d 933, 941 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1056 (1982); Harff v. Kerko-
rian, 324 A.2d 215 (Del Ch. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 347 A.2d 133 (Del. 1975). Profes-
sor Mitchell correctly states that "scholars supporting expanded bondholder rights do not have a
great deal of law supporting them." Mitchell, supra note 46, at 1169 n. 11.
137. See Rutheford B. Campbell Jr., Limited Liability for Corporate Shareholders: Myth or
Matter-of-Fact, 63 Ky. L.J. 23, 55-71 (1975).
138. See generally Albert H. Barkey, The Financial Articularion of a Fiduciary Duty to
Bondholders with Fiduciary Duties to Stockholders of the Corporation, 20 CREIGHTON L. REV.
47 (1986); William W. Bratton Jr., Corporate Debt Relationships: Legal Theory in a Time of
Restructuring, 1989 DUKE L.J. 92; Hurst & McGuinness, supra note 117; Morey W. McDaniel,
Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 Bus. LAW. 413 (1986); McDaniel, supra note 58;
Mitchell, supra note 46. The thinking in this area has been helped by works on closely related
subjects. See, e.g., James J. Hanks, Playing with Fire: Nonshareholder Consttuency Statutes in
the 1990s, 21 STETSON L. REV. 97 (1991); Kahan & Klausner, supra note 119; McDaniel, su-
pro note 85 (arguing for the use of Pareto concepts in interpreting constituency statutes); Jona-
than R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the
Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23 (1991).
139. Two authors report that more than 230 companies were involved in "event risk" trans-
actions between 1984 and 1989. Hurst & McGuinness, supra note 117, at 190 n. 14. The authors
defined "event risk" transactions as "corporate activity which results in a downgrading of the
credit rating of corporate debt obligations." This includes leveraged buyouts. Id. at n.15. Two
other authors report that from 1984 through 1988, the bonds of 183 companies "lost value as a
result of mergers, acquisitions or leveraged buyouts." Kahan & Klauser, supra note 119, at 933
n.2.
140. Probably the most famous of the cases continues to be the RJR Nabisco acquisition. See
Deborah A. DeMott, Introduction-The Biggest Deal Ever, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1.
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1980s. It seems uncontested that as a result of these transactions bondhold-
ers lost many millions of dollars.141 In the RJR Nabisco acquisition alone,
for example, estimates are that bondholders lost $40 million following the
announcement of the acquisition. 4 1 Interestingly, stockholders gained, 43
studies indicate,144 even more than bondholders lost. 4 1
The lack of fiduciary protection for creditors is especially curious when
considered in light of the societal manifestations that creditors should be
protected from harmful actions at the hands of common stockholders and
corporate managers. Some of these societal manifestations were described
in part IV of this Article and include limitations on dividend payments,
prohibition of fraudulent conveyances, bankruptcy rules, and limitations
imposed by the Trust Indenture Act. 14 6 As argued more generally in part
IV, the societal values reflected by such manifestations support an expan-
sion of generalized fiduciary protections to creditors.
Applying the fiduciary principles of this Article for the protection of
creditors not only will be consistent with such manifested values of society
but also will eliminate an indefensible distinction between money investors
who purchase equity instruments (stockholders) and money investors who
purchase debt instruments (creditors). Considered at any level, creditors'
claims for fiduciary protection are at least as strong as stockholders'. 147
141. Kahan & Klauser, supra note 119, at 933 ("[Lleveraged acquisitions and recapitaliza-
tions transformed blue-chip bonds valued in the tens of billions of dollars into speculative-grade
'junk'."); Hurst & McGuinness, supra note 117, at 187-91. McDaniel refers to the losses of
bondholders as "possibly the largest expropriation of investors in American business history."
MacDaniel, supra note 58, at 206. At least some commentators characterize these transactions as
wealth transfers. See, e.g., McDaniel, supra note 85, at 124; Coffee, supra note 10, at 1498.
142. James Sterngold, Kohlberg Leads Latest Nabisco Bids, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1988, at
D1; see generally DeMott, supra note 146.
143. Bernard Black & Joseph A. Grundfest, Shareholder Gains from Takeovers and Restruc-
turings Between 1981 and 1986. $162 Billion Is a Lot of Money, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 5 (Spr.
1988) (estimating that stockholder wealth increased $162 billion during the period as a result of
takeovers); see also Greg A. Jarrell et al., The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical
Evidence Since 1980, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 49, 51-53 (1988) (citing studies regarding shareholder
gains in takeovers).
144. See the results of studies reported in Kahn & Klauser, supra note 119, at 940 ("Studies
show that the gains to shareholders from both hostile and friendly acquisitions, on average, far
exceed losses to bondholders."); see also Coffee, supra note 10, at 1515-1521.
145. In economic terms, this result should not be surprising since the result indicates that
common stockholders were able to expropriate value from other constituencies and appropriate
some or all of the value of efficiency gains generated by the transaction.
146. See supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text.
147. The similarity in the positions of debtholders and equityholders was recognized years
ago by scholars. See ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR., STUDIES IN THE LAW OF CORPORATION FINANCE
156 (1928); Jerome Frank, Adolph A. Berle's The Modern Corporation and Private Property, 42
YALE L.J. 989, 992 (1933) (book review); ARTHUR S. DEWING, THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF
CORPORATIONS 166-67 (5th ed. 1953).
More recently, Easterbrook and Fischel opined regarding the similarity of debt and equity. See
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel F. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L.
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First, creditors' relationships with the corporation are fundamentally
the same as stockholders. Creditors, like stockholders, invest value and
depend on management for their return. Managers' actions that reduce the
value of the corporation as a whole hurt creditors in the same fashion that
such actions hurt shareholders. In some instances, the harm to creditors or
shareholders may be so slight as to seem only theoretical; at other times,
the harm may completely eliminate the investment of the creditors or
stockholders.
Similarly, at the bargaining stage, the abilities of investors to protect
themselves by negotiating and pricing risks are essentially the same,
whether they purchase debt instruments or equity instruments from the
corporation. Debt and equity are sold in the same types of transactions.
Both can be privately placed and sold publicly in underwritten transac-
tions.' " In underwritten offerings, the players and the pressures are essen-
tially the same in debt and equity offerings. The underwriter in each situa-
tion has the same incentive (or lack of incentive) to bargain hard and price
aggressively. 49 Indenture trustees, everyone concedes, are uninvolved in
the bargaining and pricing process of debt, 50 and thus their presence in no
way eliminates the need for fiduciary protections.
All of this indicates, then, that the risk of market failures, which is, as
previously suggested, one reason society continues to enforce fiduciary
duties in favor of stockholders, is at least as great for creditors as for
stockholders. 15
REV. 271, 274 n.8 (1986) (noting "no fundamental difference between debt and equity claims
from an economic perspective"); see also William H. Bratton, Corporate Debt Relationships:
Legal Theory in a Time of Restructuring, 1989 DUKE L.J. 92, 114-16; Campbell, supra note
137, at 64-67; McDaniel, supra note 58, at 218-21. Professor Mitchell seems to agree that bond-
holders and stockholders are generally in similar circumstances, but he would shape fiduciary
obligations to bondholders as a function of whether the situation involves a "vertical relation-
ship" or a "horizontal relationship." Mitchell, supra note 46, at 1180-89. But see Hurst &
McGuinness, supra note 117, at 191-92 (outlining the " investment theory," but opining that "the
legitimate expectations of the two groups of security holders differ significantly").
148. On average, one may assume that those purchasing debt from issuers in private transac-
tions are better able to protect themselves through bargaining than are those who purchase debt
from issuers in public offerings. Typically, such private purchasers have more access to infor-
mation, have more at stake, and are more sophisticated than are public purchasers. See Brudney,
supra note 106, at 1830-31. Brudney points out, however, that not all private purchasers of debt
are on equal footing. See Brudney. supra note 107, 1830 n.20. The same, of course, is true with
regard to purchasers of publicly issued and privately issued equity. McDaniel argues that one of
the important changes in the bond market in recent years is the "significant participation by in-
dividual investors. The bond market no longer is (if it ever was) the exclusive domain of institu-
tional investors able to fend for themselves." McDaniel, supra note 138, at 415.
149. See Mitchell, supra note 46, at 1183; Bratton, supra note 147, at 156 (dealing with debt
offerings); see also Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 1518-19 (dealing with equity issues).
150. See, e.g., Brudney, supra note 107, at 1830-31; Mitchell, supra note 46, at 1183;
McDaniel, supra note 138, at 429-31.
151. See William W. Batton, The Economics and Jurisprudence of Convertible Bonds, 84
WIS. L. REV. 667, 715 (1984) (discussing the inability of bond purchasers to protect themselves
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The need of creditors for broad fiduciary protections is not sufficiently
ameliorated by any alignment of interests between themselves and manag-
ers. As previously noted,"' some commentators have observed that man-
agers and creditors share certain common interests in the management of
the corporation" 3 and, thus, that managers, by pursuing their own self-
interest will protect the interests of creditors. 54 The argument is made, for
example, that managers' investment policies may be more aligned with
creditors' interests, since both have limited, but prior, claims against the
corporation's earnings and thus favor a conservative investment policy for
the corporation.' 55 Relatedly, commentators have observed that managers
and creditors share an interest in avoiding a hostile, highly leveraged take-
over."56 Thus, one may argue that, as a result of this alignment of interests,
creditors need less fiduciary protection.
The alignment in the interests of managers and creditors is less than
complete, however.""' Thus, even conceding that managers and creditors
share similar interests in the investment policies and defensive tactics,
managers otherwise usually retain an economic interest in moves that
transfer wealth from creditors to voting stockholders and themselves.
Viewed somewhat differently, the fact that corporate managers in con-
structing an investment policy or in evaluating and defending against a
hostile, highly leveraged takeover may, in their own self-interest, eschew
wealth-maximizing transactions and also transfer wealth from stockholders
through the bargaining process); Brudney, supra note 107, at 1830 & n.20 (discussing the espe-
cially disadvantaged position of purchasers of publicly issued debt and citing authority for the ar-
gument that "the substantial erosion of protective covenants in publicly issued bonds after 1970
was not readily appreciated by investors or digested by the market until debtors made that ero-
sion apparent in the mid-1980s"); Mitchell, supra note 46, at 1181-86 (discussing the structural
bases for market failures in the sale of debt instruments). But see Kahn & Klausner, supra note
119, at 981 ("Our findings are inconsistent with those commentators who claim that bondholders
cannot obtain effective contractual protection."); Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities, Firm-
Specific Capital Investments, and the Legal Treatment of Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1989
DUKE L.J. 173, 182 (Purchasers of fixed corporate claims "will . . . adjust the price they pay
for their fixed claims to compensate themselves for the prospect that shareholders will make sub-
sequent wealth transfers."); Ronald Daniels, Stakeholders and Takeovers: Can Contractarianism
Be Compassionate?, 43 TORONTO L.J. 315, 344-45 (1993) (finding that creditors are adequately
protected by the market and their ability to bargain).
152. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
153. See, e.g., Macey, supra note 151, at 182.
154. See, e.g., McDaniel, supra note 138, at 433-34.
155. Regarding the risk aversion of managers, see Allison G. Anderson, Conflicts of Inter-
est: Efficiency, Fairness and Corporate Structure, 25 UCLA L. REV. 738, 785 n. 141 (1978); cf.
Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Cost of Legal Controls, 93 YALE
L.J. 857, 862-64 (1984).
Jensen and Meckling liken managers' salary claims to a quasi-debt. See Michael C. Jensen &
William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 353-54 (1976).
156. Coffee, supra note 10, at 1519-21.
157. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
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to themselves, and thus inadvertently also transfer wealth to creditors,
means only that we should protect stockholders from such activity under
fiduciary principles. Such anticipated responses by managers in those
situations is not a basis for abandoning creditors, since many opportunities
also exist for managers to engage in wealth transfers away from creditors.
Commentators have also pointed out that the competition in the finan-
cial markets diminishes the need to extend generalized fiduciary protec-
tions to creditors. The argument is that the incentive to cause wealth trans-
fers away from creditors is diminished by the costs of such transactions to
the other constituencies, such as stockholders. Thus, if the managers and
stockholders expropriate the creditors' value, the next creditors will have
to be paid to take the risk of a repeat of the expropriation. This risk results
in a higher interest rate on future debt offerings and thus increases the cost
of capital for the corporation.'
Another way that some commentators have explained this matter is by
arguing that the company is able to sell an original debt offering without
either protective covenants or a commensurately higher interest rate by
posting a "bond" backed by the company's "reputational capital." The
"promise" supported by the bond is that the company will not take certain
action (effecting a highly leveraged transaction, for example), even though
there is no express prohibition of the action in the indenture. If the com-
pany takes the particular action, it will accordingly violate the terms of the
bond and thus forfeit its reputational capital.' 9
Two points must be made about this argument. First, even if one is
convinced that corporations do post a reputational bond, Karl Llewellyn's
analysis from years ago has proven correct. 60 Corporations are quite
willing to sacrifice the bond if the stakes are high enough, as has been the
case with leveraged buyouts. 6 The reputational bonds, therefore, are at
best only partial protections. 162
158. McDaniel, supra, note 138, at 434 ("A company with a reputation for hurting its bond-
holders will find it more difficult to sell bonds in the future.").
159. For descriptions of this argument, see Hurst & McGuinness, supra note 117, at 197;
McDaniel, supra note 58, at 238. See also John Kose & David C. Nachman, Risky Debt, Invest-
ment Incentives and Reputation in a Sequential Equilibrium, 40 J. FIN. 863, 876 (1985); Ileen
Malitz, On Financial Contracting: The Determinants of Bond Covenants, 1986 15 FIN. MGMT.
18, 24-25.
160. Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704,
722 (1931).
161. With regard to the recent highly leveraged transactions and the impact on bondholders,
Professor Coffee concluded: "[Hiaving convinced bondholders to delete most negative covenants
for reasons that seem plausibly in their mutual self-interest, managements have exploited that
trust when faced with shareholder pressures that might otherwise result in their ouster." Coffee,
supra note 10, at 1515.
162. Both Hurst and McGuinness, and McDaniel agree. See Hurst & McGuiness, supra note
117, at 198 (It "appears that the bondholders' reliance on the reputational capital of major corpo-
[Vol. 23:561
FIDUCIARY PRINCIPLES
Second, the forfeiture of a corporation's reputational bond in no way
compensates the party who was harmed as a result of the company's fail-
ure to live up to its implied promise. Thus, although the unanticipated
highly leveraged transaction may increase the company's cost of debt in
future deals, none of that additional expense goes to the existing creditors
subjected to a wealth transfer-as a result of the highly leveraged transac-
tion. The surrender of the reputational bond fails to pay the original
creditors for any harm that they suffer.
Paradoxically, instead of protecting creditors, market pressures, most
specifically the market for corporate control, actually exacerbate the vul-
nerability of creditors and thus make the case for fiduciary protection of
creditors even more compelling than the case for fiduciary protections of
stockholders.
The therapeutic value of the market for corporate control has been
much heralded. 63 The fundamental idea is that if management operates in-
efficiently, a hostile bidder will purchase all the stock of the company,
kick out the inefficient management, and reap the financial benefits of
providing better management for the assets of the target company. Thus,
the fear of the hostile takeover and management's potential loss of em-
ployment encourages management to operate in a way that maximizes the
value of the interests of the stockholders.16 This pressure seems to dimin-
ish any need for mandatory fiduciary duties imposed by law.
Unfortunately for creditors, just as the market for corporate control
puts pressure on management to manage the corporation in a way that
maximizes the value of the interests of the stockholders, the competition
for corporate control puts pressure on management to minimize the value
of creditors' investment by making all possible wealth transfers from
creditors to stockholders, The pressure on management is to maximize the
value of the interests of stockholders from all sources.
Unless management acts to expropriate for stockholders as much of
creditors' investment as is economically possible, a hostile bidder may buy
all the common stock of the company, install its own managers, expropriate
rations . . . was misplaced."); McDaniel, supra note 58, at 238 ("When covenants are incom-
plete and the company is in extremis, reputation does not fill the gap.").
163. Commentators have made strong claims about the pervasiveness of the benefits of the
market for corporate control. For example, to counter the late Professor Cary's argument that
the states are in a "race for the bottom" in which they each compete for corporate charters by
minimizing investor protection, see William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflec-
tions upon Delaware, 88 YALE L. 663 (1974), some commentators argued that the competition
for corporate control neutralizes the harmful impact of such competition, see Ralph K. Winter,
State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251
(1977).
164. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 48, at 1169-74 (1981); Kahan & Klausner, supra
note 138, at 944; Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL.
ECON. 110, 113 (1965).
19961
FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
creditors' value, and reap the financial benefit of its expropriation. To
avoid the threat of this hostile takeover, management must deliver to
stockholders all value from all sources, including expropriation. If manag-
ers are rational maximizers, they will act to expropriate creditors' value in
all situations where such action is economically possible.
All of this creates the worst possible situation. It is capitalism at its
worst, in essence creating a market for market failures. Management, as
rational maximizers, will construct market failures, situations in which
creditors are fooled about the risk they assume and thus not paid to take
the risk. Then, as rational maximizers, management will exploit the situa-
tion by expropriating the creditors' value and if they fail to exploit the
situation, a hostile bidder may do so after it acquires the company and
fires the managers.
Finally, no mechanistic or structural impediments prevent the extension
of fiduciary protection to creditors. Derivative suits, for example, will
work well for creditors enforcing their general fiduciary rights.1 5 In fact,
extending derivative rights to creditors will eliminate a long-standing
anomaly in derivative actions. '
Although today corporate managers owe fiduciary duties only to share-
holders, a derivative action against a manager for a breach of the man-
ager's fiduciary duty is brought in the right of the corporation, and any re-
covery is paid to the corporation and is for the benefit of all investors, in-
cluding creditors. 67 This remedy is obviously inconsistent with the under-
lying duty of managers to shareholders only. This duty, if enforced in a
conceptually consistent way, would lead only to a direct right in share-
holders to pursue a remedy as an individual or as part of a class action.
A derivative suit, however, works conceptually well under the pro-
posed principles. A derivative action could be initiated by any investor,
and any recovery would be paid to the corporation, with the rights of the-
investors to the recovery determined by contract and fiduciary duties.
165. Dean Prunty's work on the origins of the derivative suit lends support for the appropri-
ateness of permitting creditors to enforce rights through a derivative action. See Bert S. Prunty,
The Shareholders Derivative Suit: Notes on its Derivation, 32 N.Y.U. L. REV. 980, 992, 994
(1957) ("[Tlhe origin of the derivative suit . . . lies in judicial recognition of a new wrong or
maladjustment for which pre-existing legal procedures proved more or less inadequate." The de-
rivative suit "was born and nurtured as a corrective for managerial abuse in economic units
which by their nature deprived some participants of an effective voice in their administration, ").
Professors Coffee and Schwartz, however, argue against permitting creditors to institute deriva-
tive suits on the grounds that such a change would chill socially useful risk taking. See John C.
Coffee & Donald E. Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a Pro-
posal for Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 313 n.277 (1981).
166, As previously discussed, creditors presently have no right to enforce claims through
derivative actions. See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
167. In administering derivative suits, courts have developed rules that protect creditors. See




The expansion of fiduciary principles to protect employees can be jus-
tified on the basis of widely shared societal values, but the matter is com-
plex and the debate is emotionally charged.
Predictably, the Contractarians argue against fiduciary duties for em-
ployees by claiming that society is better off allowing employees and cor-
porations to work out their own arrangements regarding fiduciary duties
and other terms of the employment contract. 168 They imagine that employ-
ees are able to protect themselves by bargaining with their employers.
Contractarians seem to consider the terms of an employment contract the
"routine stuff of ordinary life" that employees are able to manage. 69 Con-
sent of the parties, therefore, eliminates any claim of unfairness, so the ar-
gument goes. 170
The Contractarians also argue that firms have a strong economic inter-
est in treating employees fairly.' 7' Unfair treatment of employees imposes
costs on the corporation, since, for example, to fire unfairly a productive
employee costs the firm a good employee, creates morale problems for
remaining workers,"" and makes recruitment of future workers more diffi-
cult.'73 Corporations, it is argued, attempt to avoid these costs by treating
employees fairly,' and this self-imposed aspect lessens the need for any
state-imposed, mandatory protections for employees. 17
168. Presenting this position powerfully, Professor Epstein imagines as facts employees with
the capability to understand employment arrangements ("we are dealing with the routine stuff of
ordinary life; people who are competent enough to marry, vote, and pray are not unable to pro-
tect themselves in their day-to-day business transactions") and who, in fact, generally understand
their employment arrangements ("nor is there any reason to believe that such contracts are
marred by misapprehensions, since employers and employees know the footing on which they
have contracted"). Epstein, In Defense, supra note 28, at 954-55. Such facts, of course, are es-
sential to the Contractarians' position. See Daniels, supra note 39, at 327.
169. Epstein, In Defense, supra note 28, at 954. Professor Macey is less assertive factually,
although he arrives at the same result. He concludes that employees do make investments in
firms and are subject to expropriation but that, nonetheless, matters are best left to private ar-
rangements. Macey, supra note 157, at 176, 188-92, 200-01.
170. Epstein, In Defense, supra note 28, at 953-55.
171. This is the same argument proffered regarding the expropriation of creditors' value.
Specifically, Contractarians argue that the corporation will not expropriate creditors' value be-
cause it raises the corporation's future cost of capital. See supra notes 158-62 and accompanying
text.
172. See, e.g., Clive Bull, The Existence of Self-Enforcing Implicit Contracts, 102 Q.J. OF
ECON. 147, 149-54 (1987).
173. Macey, supra note 151, at 192 ("employer's need to maintain its reputation in the
community and to attract new workers in the future will tend to discourage exploitation"); Ep-
stein, In Defense, supra note 28, at 967-68, 970, 974.
174. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 259-61
(1985); William J. Carney, Does Defining Constituencies Matter?, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 385,
405-12 (1990); Costas Azariadis & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Implicit Contracts and Fixed Price
Equilibria, 98 Q.J. ECON. 1, 15-19 (Supp. 1983).
175. For a description of these arguments, see Daniels, supra note 39, at 336-40.
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The Regulators, on the other hand, predictably dispute the factual un-
derpinnings of the Contractarians' position. In part, the Regulators' view
of employees is shaped by a theory that scholars have developed and that
likens employees to money investors in the corporation. Proponents of this
theory argue that employees, instead of investing money in the corpora-
tion, which is the case with stockholders and creditors, invest their own
human capital in the corporation'7 6 and have legitimate expectations of a
return on their investments. 177
The factual assumptions of this scholarship are that employees during
the early years of employment by their firms are paid at levels below their
opportunity wages and their marginal productivity.' Employees are will-
ing to accept these lower wages because of an implied promise of job se-
curity and wages greater than their marginal productivity during the latter
part of the employees' careers. This "implicit contract" between employ-
ees and their employers benefits the companies in the early years of em-
ployment and protects workers during the later years of their employ-
ment. 1
79
These scholars argue, however, that a real risk exists that the employ-
ers will opportunistically breach the implicit contract. An employer (i.e.,
the corporation or, more appropriately, the other constituencies of the
corporation, such as common stockholders) acting as a rational maximizer
may find it to be in furtherance of its own economic interest not to live up
to the implied promise of job security and wages above the employee's
marginal productivity.8 0 These arguments are perhaps most powerfully
made in the context of corporate takeovers, where commentators contend
176. See, e.g., Joseph W. Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611,
621 (1988); Clyde W. Summers, Labor Law as the Century Turns: A Changing of the Guard, 67
NEB. L. REV. 7, 15-16 (1988); David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 223,
234-35 (1991).
177. Recent scholarship arguing that employee investments of human capital necessitate ex-
tra contractual protection for the investing employees includes Stone, Employees as Stakeholders,
supra note 76, at 48 ("[Elmployees' interests should be protected from major corporate restruc-
turing decisions that threaten to expropriate those investments."), and O'Connor, supra note 75.
178. See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EDUCATION 129-30 (1993); MASAHIKO AOKI, THE
CO-OPERATIVE GAME THEORY OF THE FIRM 14 (3d ed. 1984); Bull, supra note 172, at 658. For
a graphic illustration of this theory, see Michael L. Wachter & George M. Cohen, The Law and
Economics of Collective Bargaining: An Introduction and Application to the Problems of Subcon-
tracting, Partial Closure and Relocation, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1362 (1988).
179. The theory is well explained by Stone in Policing, supra note 76, at 363-69; Stone,
Employees as Stakeholders, supra note 76, at 48-53. See also O'Connor, supra note 75, at 1205-
07.
180. For descriptions of these risks, see Stone, Policing, supra note 76, at 369; Stone, Em-
ployees as Stakeholders, supra note 76, at 52; and O'Connor, supra note 75, at 1208-10.
Interestingly, Judge Posner offers a similar analysis as an economic explanation for age discrimi-
nation laws. See POSNER, supra note 2, at 339.
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that the human capital investments of employees have been routinely ex-
propriated. "t'
If one accepts the theory that employees make an "investment" in the
firm '8 and thus have some legitimate expectation to a return on that in-
vestment, the similarities between the human capital investors and money
investors become striking, and the arguments to extend fiduciary protec-
tions to employees become stronger. Like the investments of stockholders
and creditors, employees' investments can be lost if, to use an extreme but
obvious example, mismanagement leads to the business failure of the cor-
poration. The value of employees' investments in the corporation also can
be lost through wealth transfers when, for example, the corporation
(perhaps following a change in control through a takeover) opportunisti-
cally breaches its implied contracts to pay older employees at a rate above
their marginal productivity.
Also, as was true in the case of creditors, the pressure created by the
market for corporate control generates incentives for managers to expro-
priate the human capital investments of employees.'83 Thus, if managers do
not engage in the opportunistic breach of the implicit contracts with em-
ployees, corporate raiders may acquire the company in a hostile bid,
change managers, and reap the benefits of their own opportunistic breach
of the employees' implicit contracts. Managers, as rational maximizers,
will act to avoid the threat of the raiders by effecting their own preemptive
opportunistic breach of the employees' implicit contracts.
Although the implicit contract theory may well be an acceptable ap-
proximation of reality, the theory, in any event, is a compelling metaphor
for society's general concern for employees' well-being. Employees have
palpable interests in the corporation,' in its efficient management, and in
181. See Shleifer & Summers, supra note 96. Oliver Hart, however, after suggesting that
such a line of argument may justify defensive tactics by management, finds the entire argument
difficult to sort out. He finds it difficult to determine whether the high wages of employees be-
fore a takeover are a function of past service or "the result of managerial slack or the price man-
agement has paid for an easy life." He fears, as a result, the throttling of "efficiency-enhancing
bids." Oliver Hart, An Economist's View of Fiduciary Duty, 43 U. TORONTO. L.J. 299, 312
(1993).
182. Not all scholars accept the fact that employees invest in the firm by underpricing their
services during part of their careers. See, e.g., Boyan Jovanovic, Job Matching and the Theory
of Turnover, 87 J. POL. ECON. 972, 973 (1979). Even advocates of protection for employees
concede that the empirical evidence is inconclusive on this matter. See Stone, Employees as
Stakeholders, supra note 76.
183. See Stone, Employees as Stakeholders, supra note 76, at 64-74.
184, Not surprisingly, a similar view is expressed by Professor Clyde Summers:
[Eimployees who provide the labor [for corporations] are as much members of that
enterprise as the shareholders who provide the capital. Indeed, the employees may
have made a greater investment in the enterprise by their years of services, may have
much less ability to withdraw, and may have a greater stake in the future of the enter-
prise than many of the stockholders.
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not being excluded from future participation in the corporation. Misman-
agement can significantly and adversely affect the interests of employees.
Other constituencies often can gain (or limit losses) by replacing employees.
Whether or not one classifies that as the expropriation of an investment of
human capital through a breach of the corporation's implicit contract with
employees, sympathy for displaced workers and rules and mechanisms
that provide relief for such workers are consistent with society's clear and
persistent manifestations of concern for the well-being of employees.",
All of this, however, does not eliminate the need for the Regulators
(and society) to deal with the claim of the Contractarians that employees
are able to protect themselves through negotiating the explicit and implicit
terms of employment contracts. In that regard, Regulators claim that mar-
ket failures are sufficiently significant to justify the imposition of manda-
tory terms, such as fiduciary duties, on the parties. One argument is that
bounded rationality makes it impossible to construct a contract that will
cover all contingencies.' Such extensive and detailed contracts, commen-
tators argue, are cost-prohibitive," 7 and employees do not have sufficient
information to assess the risks they face in their employment. Claims also
are made that employees are too unsophisticated to protect themselves
through bargaining. 8 ' Finally, some argue that, at least in certain in-
stances, present law makes agreements for future payments of invested
human capital unenforceable. 9
Clyde W. Summers, Codetermination in the United States: A Projection of Problems and Poten-
tial, 4. J. OF COMP. CORP. L. & Scf. REG. 155, 170 (1982). Aoki similarly states that
"employees form an integral part of the firm for which they work to a far greater extent than
shareholders." AOKI, supra note 178. It has also been pointed out that harm to employees of
firms may have significant, indirect adverse impacts on other groups. See, e.g., Peter E. Mill-
spaugh, Plant Closings and the Prospects for a Judicial Response, 8 J. CORP. L. 483, 484-86
(1983).
185. See infra notes 204-10 and accompanying text.
186. See, e.g.. John C. Coffee Jr., The Uncertain Case for Takeover Reform: An Essay on
Stockholders, Stakeholders and Bust-Ups, Wis. L. REV. 435, 448 (1988); Hart, supra note 181,
at 303 (noting that it is "hard to write a contract that specifically rules out all the possible bad
actions that management might undertake"). Not all agree that this is a basis for interfering with
free contracting. Professor Williamson, for example, concedes the inability to anticipate all pos-
sible conditions but argues that the market will adjust in the next case. Oliver Williamson, Cor-
porate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197, 1197-1202 (1984).
187. O'Connor, supra note 75, at 1241.
188. See Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalistic Motives in Contract and Tort Law,
with Special Reference to Compulsoty Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV.
563, 630 (1982).
189. For example, Professor Stone makes the point that a collective bargaining agreement in
which X corporation agrees to pay all employees the fair value of their human capital investment
in the event that they are terminated without cause would be unenforceable against a firm that
acquired the assets of X and may be unenforceable against a firm that acquired X in a statutory
merger. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the Corporate Structure: Changing Concep-
tions and Emerging Possibilities, 55 U. CHI. L.. REV. 73, 102-11 (1988); Stone. Employees as
Stakeholders, supra note 76, at 62.
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The Regulators also discount the Contractarian argument that employees
attain protection as a result of the firm's desire to protect its reputation as
a good and fair employer. Regulators consider the firm's interest in ensur-
ing its reputation as a good employer to be a weak protection for employ-
ees'o and, in support of their position, are able to point to statistics indicat-
ing that employees are often subjected to unjustified discipline and dis-
missal.'
Commentators also point out that employees, unlike money investors,
are unable to limit their risks through diversification."'2 Modern portfolio
theory demonstrates that money investors are able to reduce their eco-
nomic risk by holding a diversified portfolio of investments. 93 Commenta-
tors argue that this option is not open to employees' human capital invest-
ment because that investment is by definition undiversified.
The overarching argument of Regulators (and one that is, at least to some
extent, inextricably entwined with other Regulator arguments), however, is
that the bargaining power between the parties is unequal. The lonely worker,
in the view of the Regulators, is grossly overmatched when bargaining with a
giant corporation (or even a local hardware store) for terms of employment. 94
The theoretical soundness of this last line of argument is, not surprisingly,
hotly contested by Contractarians, who point out that imposing mandatory
terms in the employment relationship in no way relieves the bargaining mis-
match.19 Thus, Contractarians argue that if society requires a particular term
in an employment contract and the term is expensive to the corporation, the
corporation will respond by otherwise reducing the benefits offered to the
employee. 196
190. Carl Shapiro & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device, 74
AM. ECON. REV. 433, 442 (1984); Stone, Policing, supra note 76, at 371; Clyde W. Summers, In'vidua
Protection Against Unust Dismissal: tZme for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481, 520 (1976); Lawrence E.
Blades, F Mployment at Will v. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of &nployer Power,
67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1412-13 (1967); Clive Bull, The Existence of Self-Enforcing Implicit Contracts,
102 Q.J. ECON. 147, 148 (1987); Shleifer & Summers, supra note 96, at 39; Stone, _npLoyees as Stake-
holders, supra note 76, at 55 ([ln large and widely dispersed labor markets, reputational factors are often
inadequate to the task" of protecting against opportunistic breaches).
191. For some interesting evidence regarding abusive employer conduct, see Summers, su-
pra note 184, at 507, 532 (citing an American Association of Arbitrators study that shows more
than one-half of discharge cases resulted in employee reinstatement and reports the arbitration of
"tens of thousands of discipline cases, finding nearly half to be instances of injustice").
192. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 75, at 78-79.
193. For a description of modern portfolio theory, see RICHARD A. BREALEY, AN IN-
TRODUCTION TO RISK AND RETURN FROM COMMON STOCKS, 42-46, 48-54, 115-31 (1969).
194. Such a picture is painted, for example, in Summer, supra note 184; Lawrence E.
Blades, Employment at Will v. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Em-
ployer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1404-10 (1967).
195. See, e.g., Macey, supra note 138, at 37-38 (1991).
196. See generally POSNER, supra note 2, at 101-05. Applied to the area of fundamental
corporate change, for example, rules designed to protect stakeholders merely "rearrange" the
relationships, suggests Macey. Macey, supra note 151, at 180.
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While corporate managers presently owe no fiduciary duty to employ-
ees, extending the protection of the Principle Requiring Corporate Value
Maximization and the Principle Prohibiting Wealth Transfers to employees
is consistent with society's manifest concern for employees. Society has
persistently treated labor differently from other economic inputs and has
been unwilling to subject employees to the risks of an unrestrained pursuit
of economic efficiency. Thus, at a general level, society has not left em-
ployers and employees free to contract as they see fit but, instead, has im-
posed mandatory provisions on their otherwise private arrangements.
Manifestations of the mandatory provisions are many and include the
obvious examples of minimum wage laws,' 97 health and safety rules, 98 and
child labor laws.9 These examples of special, mandatory terms imposed
on the contractual arrangements between employers and employees reflect
society's view that the market is not sufficient protection for employees
who "bargain" for the terms of their employment and that in this area the
value derived from the pursuit of economic efficiency must at times be
subordinated to other values important to society.
Other laws express, perhaps even more closely, values that support
extending general fiduciary protections to employees. Various legislatures,
for example, have passed laws that protect the health coverage of certain
terminated employees, 2°° require notice before plant closings,2"' and even
require severance pay in certain cases 0 2 All of these laws seem designed
to soften the fall of employees who lose their jobs as a result of expropria-
tion, mismanagement, or otherwise.2"3
Although extending to employees the protection of the Principle Re-
quiring Corporate. Value Maximization and the Principle Prohibiting
Wealth Transfers is sound policy and consistent with the general manifes-
tations of societal values, problems appear when the principles are en-
forced by courts under general fiduciary standards. Practical considera-
tions and legal process concerns must be c6nsidered carefully in evaluating
the most effective method of implementing the principles.
With regard to the Principle Requiring Corporate Value Maximization,
permitting employees to enforce this obligation against managers is sensible
and creates no particular problems. As described above, employees' interests
197. 29 U.S.C.A. § 201 (West 1994).
198. Id. § 651.
199. Id. § 212.
200. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 310 (1994).
201. 1988 Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-09 (1994).
202. HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 394B-9 to -10 (Supp. 1994); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 26, §
625-B (West 1994).
203. Professor Stone refers to "the widely held intuition" regarding the unfairness of laying
off "employees who have substantial seniority without some form of warning, severance pay,
and pension protection." Stone, Employees as Stakeholders, supra note 76, at 52.
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in the corporation can be damaged by actions that diminish the value of
the corporation, and employees seem to have at least as legitimate a claim
to institute remedial derivative suits as have stockholders or creditors. A
derivative suit is the correct vehicle to permit employees to enforce the
obligation of managers to maximize the value of the corporation, since any
recovery becomes corporate property and is distributed to constituencies in
a manner that protects their initial investment expectations.
With regard to the Principle Prohibiting Wealth Transfers, however,
courts would face insurmountable practical and legal process problems
were they to attempt under general fiduciary standards to protect employees
from wealth transfers, including the expropriation of human capital. Take
as an example claims by 2,000 employees terminated after their company
is acquired in a takeover. Each employee would have a separate claim un-
der the implied contract theory that he or she had made individual human
capital investments that had not been repaid. To evaluate these claims, a
court in each of the 2,000 cases would have to determine whether each
employee had underpriced his or her services, the period of time during
which the services had been underpriced, the amount during each pay pe-
riod of such underpricing, and the amount of any payback by the corpora-
tion with respect to the employee's investment. Obviously, that would be a
staggering and exceedingly costly2°m undertaking by courts and an entirely
unworkable solution.205
Such difficulties, however, should not lead society to abandon its at-
tempts to protect employees against such wealth transfers but, instead,
should cause society to consider a legislative response. Unlike courts, leg-
islatures are capable of constructing specific, administrable, and priceable
solutions for expropriation of employees' wealth.
Notwithstanding that, purposefully, no solutions are suggested by this
Article for the problem of the expropriation of employee human capital,
the following observations are offered. Preliminarily, one recognizes that
the remedy of choice for employees who are terminated and thus lose their
human capital investments is a mandatory reinstatement to their old jobs.
Mandatory reinstatement, however, is too drastic a remedy. Thus, while it
has been argued that employment should be maintained "when production
204. Regarding the difficulties of calculating the value of human capital investment by em-
ployees, see Stone, Employees as Stakeholders, supra note 76, at 50-51. Perhaps an even more
pessimistic picture of evaluation difficulties is disclosed as Professor Stone attempts to fashion a
"tin parachute" pay provision that approximates an appropriate payout for the loss of employees'
human capital investment in the firm. Id. at 59-60. Professor Macey concludes that it would be
difficult to calculate and award appropriate specific capital to dismissed employees. Macey, su-
pra note 151, at 193.
205. Professor Epstein uses a similar argument in support of the employment-at-will doctrine
and against a rule requiring cause for dismissal of employees. Epstein, In Defense, supra note
28, at 953.
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declines temporarily,"206 commentators otherwise do not argue in favor of
mandatory reinstatement but, instead, propose a monetary settlement of
claims as the appropriate response.20° Mandatory reinstatement is simply
too costly in terms of lost economic efficiency to be a viable remedy in
this area.20 1
A monetary remedy in the form of a payment similar to severance pay
also is attractive because of its theoretical consistency with the implicit
contract theory, a theory which, either as an approximation of reality or as
a metaphor, is appealing. Under the implicit contract theory, employees'
investments of human capital seem not to entitle them to lifetime jobs but,
instead, to an economic return on their investments.
Accordingly, were society acting through its legislature to determine
that employees need protection from expropriation of their human capital
investments, a statute requiring employers to provide employees with
some predetermined "severance pay" as compensation for the employees'
human capital investment, although a second-best solution from the em-
ployees' perspective, would be manageable by the market and should
(although I doubt this is true) be only mildly objectionable to Contractari-
ans. An example will help illuminate this.
Assume that Congress decides that the implicit contract theory has va-
lidity and that employees' investments are not properly protected by the
market and thus necessitate protection from expropriation. Congress by
law could require employers to pay all employees who are terminated
without cause termination benefits equal to a stated percentage of their an-
nual salary, the percentage dependent on how long they had been with the
company. Contractarians (and employers) would object, of course, but if
the market for employees is operating efficiently (an argument that Con-
tractarians proffer in support of the need for no mandatory protection of
employees), the result of the law will be to lower wages in the early stages
of employees' careers because of the contingent liability for terminated
employees.209
206. O'Connor, supra note 75, at 1207. A similar view is expressed in Edward N. Gamber,
Long-Term Risk-Sharing Wage Contracts in an Economy Subject to Permanent and Temporary
Shocks, 6 J. LAB. EcON. 83, 84 (1988).
207. Larry Samuelson, Implicit Contracts with Heterogeneous Labor, 3 J. LAB. ECON. 70,
87 (1985).
208. One commentator sympathetic to the claim of expropriation of human capital invest-
mTents nonetheless rejects solutions that would make firms "reluctant to reduce their work forces
.. for legitimate, market-driven reasons. , . ." The author fears that it would "deprive troubled firms
of flexibility to restructure their costs, thereby hastening firm failure." Stone, Employees as
Stakeholders, supra note 76, at 62. The author fears that it would "deprive troubled firms of
flexibility to restructure their costs, thereby hastening firm failure," Id.
209. Contractarians, for example, argue that imposing mandatory terms will not change the




To reemphasize, mandatory severance pay for employees terminated
without cause is not offered substantively as a solution to expropriation of
human capital investment t0 Instead, the solution is offered only as an ex-
ample of the method the legislature could use in approaching the problem.
Any solution, however, must be one that the market can price and courts
can administer efficiently or, better yet, be one that is so clear that courts
will rarely become involved in enforcement.
D. Revlon Duties
The application of the Principle Requiring Corporate Value Maximiza-
tion eliminates the nonsensical distinction that courts make between corpo-
rate managers' so-called Revlon duties and their duties when Revlon is not
implicated.
In Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,' " the Su-
preme Court of Delaware held that in a takeover situation, once the target
is up for sale, the duty of the target's managers changes "from the preser-
vation of ... [the target] as a corporate entity to the maximization of the...
[target's] value at a sale for the stockholders' benefit.""' One negative
implication of this rule is that when the company is not up for sale and
thus the special Revlon duties do not apply,"' managers may engage in
tactics to protect the "corporate bastion" even, it seems, if such actions
are less than value-maximizing.
Permitting managers to protect the corporate bastion by engaging in
moves that are not wealth-maximizing is unsound, since such a rule en-
ables managers to undermanage corporate assets and throttle the flow of
those assets to their more efficient use. As discussed earlier, managers as
rational maximizers sometimes have a strong self-interest in undermanaging
210. One may argue against ensuring payment in full of the present value of an employee's
human capital investment on the grounds that it would create perverse incentives and a moral
hazard, since employees protected by such rights "might be tempted to shirk in order to provoke
a staff reduction." Stone, Employees as Stakeholders, supra note 76, at 60. The argument is un-
persuasive, however, if employees' claims are limited to the present value of their "firm specific
capital." Such a limitation on recovery is not only consistent with the implied contract theory but
also would seem to reduce significantly an employee's incentive to cause a staff reduction, since
if employees shirk, they risk losing the income stream from their future employment, which is
the same risk that is thought to inspire all workers.
211. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
212. The court went on to state: "The directors' role changed from defenders of the corpo-
rate bastion to auctioneers, charged with getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of
the company." Id. at 182.
213. Not surprisingly, the Delaware courts have been forced to deal with the question of
when the Revlon duties become applicable. Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillian, Inc., 559 A.2d
1261 (Del. 1989); Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989);
Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994) (all indicating
that Revlon duties attach not only when the target is faced with a bust-up but also when the target
is faced with a change in control).
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corporate assets,2 4 and this interest is perhaps seen most vividly when the
corporation is faced with an unsolicited takeover bid. In such a case, man-
agers want to protect their jobs, even if the offering price of an unfriendly
bidder reflects the bidder's confidence that it can deploy the corporate as-
sets more efficiently than existing managers can.215
The proposed principles help eliminate such undesirable results and, in
addition, provide clearer guidance regarding managers' fiduciary duties.
Accordingly, if hit with an unsolicited takeover bid, the target's managers
operating under the proposed principles have the same duties they had the
instant before the bid, which are duties to maximize the value of the target
corporation and avoid transfers of wealth. In such circumstances, the first
decision of the target's managers is to determine whether the unsolicited
bid maximizes the value of the target. If a higher bid is possible or alter-
native uses for the assets (including the managers' continued management
of the assets) are more efficient, the target's managers should resist the
bid. If, on the other hand, the bid maximizes the value of the target's as-
sets, managers should take steps to facilitate the acquisition by the bidder,
provided that the bid does not expropriate the value of any of the target's
money investors." 6 Managers, however, may not resist the bid on the ba-
sis of expropriation of money investors' value unless managers are unable
to restructure the bid in a way that eliminates the expropriation. In that re-
gard, courts should be most suspicious of claims by managers that such
restructuring is impossible, since the bidder should be indifferent as to the
recipient of its payment for the target.
214. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
215. At least two other arguments support elimination of any special Revlon duties. First,
investors harbor legitimate expectations that managers will act at all times to maximize the value
of the corporation. See supra text accompanying notes 103-10. Additionally, an economic argu-
ment supports elimination of special Revlon duties through the broad application of the Principle
Requiring Corporate Value Maximization, Already, courts (and thus litigants and their attorneys)
have spent significant resources litigating the question of whether facts support the application of
the special Revlon duties. See, e.g., Mills Acquisition Co., 559 A.2d at 1261; Paramount Com-
munications, Inc., 571 A.2d at 1140; QVC Network, 637 A.2d at 34. The expenses of dealing
with these issues, both at the stage where managers make decisions and at the litigation stage,
would be eliminated by the broad application of the Principle Requiring Corporate Value Maxi-
mization.
216. As with the application of the Principle Requiring Corporate Value Maximization, the
application of the Principle Prohibiting Wealth Transfers in such situations would facilitate clar-
ity. For example, in Revlon, the court stated that in responding to an unsolicited bid, considera-
tion of the interests of corporate constituencies other than stockholders "may be permissible,"
but apparently only in instances where such actions "are rationally related [to] benefits accruing
to the stockholders." 506 A.2d at 182. The court then stated: "However, such concern for non-
stockholder interests is inappropriate when an auction among active bidders is in progress, and
the object no longer is to protect or maintain the corporate enterprise but to sell it to the highest
bidder." Id. Obviously, such language is confusing but seems to indicate that when the corpora-




One should notice again, however, how unprotected these principles
leave employees in potential wealth transfer situations, including take-
overs. As described earlier, practical and legal process considerations
make it impossible for courts acting under general fiduciary standards to
extend the protection of the Principle Prohibiting Wealth Transfers to em-
ployees. If, therefore, society concludes that employees are vulnerable to
expropriation of their human capital investment and merit protection in
that regard, legislatures (instead of courts) must provide the appropriate
remedies.
E. Valuation of Minority Interests in Affiliated Mergers
The Principle Prohibiting Wealth Transfers should have a beneficial
and clarifying impact on the valuation of minority interests in affiliated
mergers.
Problems in this area may begin when a corporation (Parent) acquires a
substantial majority, say seventy percent, of the common stock of a previ-
ously independent company (Subsidiary), which, after Parent's acquisi-
tion, continues to have thirty percent of its common stock held publicly.
The response of an efficient market to Parent's acquisition may be to de-
crease the per share price of the minority interest, 17 in part, at least, due
to the perceived risk that Parent will acquire minority's interest in Subsidi-
ary in an unfairly priced transaction.28
Subsequently, Parent may in fact complete the absorption of Subsidiary
by, for example, merging Subsidiary into Parent. In such a second-step
transaction, however, minority stockholders are protected by the intrinsic
fairness test, which requires an evaluation of whether the minority stock-
holders received a "fair price" in the acquisition, 219 and by an appraisal
statute, which ensures that dissenting stockholders received "fair value"
for their stock.220
If, however, "fair price" or "fair value" is calculated by reference to
the market price of the minority shares,22' the expropriation of minority
217. Charles W. Murdock, The Evolution of Effective Remedies for Minority Shareholders
and Its Impact on Valuation of Minority Shares, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 425, 478 (1990);
J.A.C. Hetherington & Michael P. Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory
Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1, 5 (1977).
218. Victor Brudney, Equal Treatment of Shareholders in Corporate Distributions and Reor-
ganizations, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1073, 1099 (1983); Theodore N. Mirvis, Two-Tier Pricing: Some
Appraisal and "Entire Fairness' Valuation Issues, 38 Bus. LAW. 485, 489 (1982-83); Carole B.
Silver, Fair Dealing Comes of Age in the Regulation of Going Private Transactions, 9 J. CORP.
L. 385, 396 (1983-84).
219. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
220. See, e.g., RMBCA § 12.01(3) and 13.02 (1994).
221. Cases involving valuation of minority interests in a corporation include Kalabogias v.
Georgiou, 627 N.E.2d 51, 57 (11. 1993); Dermody v. Sticco, 465 A.2d 948, 951 (N.J. 1983);
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426 A.2d 1333, 1356 (Del. 1981); Citron v. E.I. Du Pont de Ne-
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stockholders' value, which started with Parent's original acquisition of the
seventy percent interest in Subsidiary, is complete. The loss suffered by
minority stockholders as a result of the threat that Parent would force an
unfair merger on Subsidiary is then impounded in "fair price" or "fair
value" through the use of market price as a basis of calculation.
The broad application of the Principle Prohibiting Wealth Transfers
will ameliorate these problems at all levels. Thus, when Parent first ac-
quires its seventy percent interest in Subsidiary, the adverse impact on the
market price of minority's shares should be reduced if the market can be
convinced that the Principle Protecting Wealth Transfers will protect the
minority from a subsequent transaction that expropriates a part of their
wealth. Similarly, minority interests are protected at the second step of the
acquisition by utilizing a calculus of "fair price" or "fair value" that
eliminates any market discount resulting from risk of a wealth-transferring
transaction. Specifically, in that regard, minority stockholders subjected to
an affiliated merger should receive an amount equal to the present value of
their proportionate share of Subsidiary's projected stream of corporate
earnings, assuming that, at all times in the future, managers would maxi-
mize the value of the corporation and would not engage in wealth transfers
detrimental to the interests of the minority stockholders.
F. Consent to a Non-Pareto Move: Failure To Pay Noncumulative
Preferred Dividends and Other Related Matters
An interesting and instructive problem is presented by the old dividend
credit cases. 2 Although the circumstances that generated these cases are
less than usual in today's world, the cases nonetheless are an apt vehicle to
consider how courts should deal with the claim that a constituency pro-
tected by the Principle Protecting Wealth Transfers agreed to assume the
risk of a non-Pareto move by managers.
The dividend credit cases, which caused considerable interest in the
corporate world years ago,223 arose when corporations sold noncumulative
mours & Co., 584 A.2d 490, 507 (Del. 1990); In re Valuation of Common Stock of Libby,
McNeil & Libby, 406 A.2d 54, 61 (Me. 1979).
222. See Sanders v. Cuba R.R. Co., 120 A.2d 849 (N.J. 1956); Agnew v. American Ice
Co., 61 A.2d 154 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1948); Day v. United States Cast Iron Pipe &
Foundry Co., 123 A. 546, aff'd, 126 A. 302 (N.J. 1924) (the court was equally divided). Other
courts rejected the dividend credit rule. See Wabash Ry. Co. v. Barclay, 280 U.S. 197 (1930);
Guttmann v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 189 F.2d. 927 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 867
(1952).
223. See Adolph A. Berle, Jr., Noncumulative Preferred Stock, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 358
(1923); Norman D. Lattin, Noncumulative Preferred Stock, 25 ILL. L. REV. 148 (1930); Alex-
ander H. Frey, The Distribution of Corporate Dividends, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 735 (1941); Note,
Dividend Rights of Noncumulative Preferred Stock, 61 YALE L.J. 245 (1952); Note, Right of




preferred stock and then refused to pay dividends on the stock. In such
situations, preferred stockholders claimed unfairness, since the foregone
dividends decreased the value of their investments and accrued to the
benefit of the residual claimants (i.e., the common stockholders), who, of
course, elected the managers that determined the dividend policy. 24
Pleaded under Principle Prohibiting Wealth Transfers, preferred stock-
holders claim that the decision not to pay preferred dividends violates
managers' fiduciary duties since it generates a wealth transfer detrimental
to preferred stockholders. Managers and common stockholders, on the
other hand, can claim that, even if the decision not to pay preferred divi-
dends decreases the wealth of preferred stockholders, the preferred stock-
holders consent and are paid to take the risk that managers might pass
over preferred dividends. Since, under the Principle Prohibiting Wealth
Transfers, managers may make a wealth-decreasing move if the harmed
constituency, the preferred stockholders in this case, consent to the risk of
the move and are paid to take the risk, the issue seems joined.
In resolving the question of whether preferred stockholders consented
to the nonpayment of dividends, courts should rely heavily on the proper
allocation of the burdens of proof, as outlined in part IV.B. Thus, for the
reasons stated in that section, once the preferred stockholders establish that
the determination not to pay their dividends decreases the value of their
investment, managers should bear the heavy burden of establishing that the
preferred stockholders consented to the risk of such a nonpayment of divi-
dends.
The actual content of the dividend credit rule is worth examining as an
example of the type of rules that may be sensible in such cases. The rule
provides that, prior to the payment of any dividends to common stock-
holders, noncumulative preferred dividends that are passed over must be
paid to preferred stockholders for those years in which the corporation has
earnings sufficient to cover the preferred dividends.22 For at least two rea-
sons, the dividend credit rule is an attractive resolution of the question of
whether the failure to pay such preferred dividends violates managers' fi-
duciary duties.
224. An interesting twist on this is Baron v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 337 A.2d 653
(Del. 1975), appeal dismissed, 365 A.2d 136 (Del. 1976), in which the company's articles of in-
corporation gave to preferred stockholders the right to elect a majority of the company's board of
directors in the event of the failure to pay preferred dividends. Under this provision, the pre-
ferred stockholders gained control of the company's board of directors and thereafter refused to
eliminate the dividend arrearage necessary to meet the threshold for their required relinquishment
of their election rights. Suing for relief, the common stockholders alleged that the company had
sufficient funds available to permit payment of the arrearage. The proper analysis of this case is
the same as the analysis proffered generally in this section.
225. For a good statement of the dividend credit rule (as well as a statement of the contrary
rule), see Day, 126 A. at 304-05.
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First, the rule represents a reasonable approximation of the deal to
which the parties consented at the market price. It seems reasonable that
the parties thought (and thus impounded in the price of the preferred
stock) that managers would pay the preferred dividends if the corporation
were in a position to do so, and the existence of earnings may be a good
indication that the company was able to pay preferred dividends.
Second, such a rule provides an incentive for better bargaining and
thus enhanced economic efficiency in future deals. The dividend credit
rule encourages the most efficient party, which is the corporation acting
through its managers, to provide better information to the future investors
purchasing noncumulative preferred stock, and it encourages better bar-
gaining mechanisms and structures when the company undertakes the sale
of such preferred stock to investors. The dividend credit rule will encour-
age the corporation to draft clear language regarding the rights of pre-
ferred stockholders to dividends and to call these terms to the attention of
preferred stockholders. Without such action, the corporation cannot be
sure of the validity of the consent of preferred stockholders to the relin-
quishment of their dividend rights in the event dividends are not paid.
In numerous other situations the question of an investor's consent to a
wealth transfer may arise. Obvious examples include managers' decisions
to redeem preferred stock 22 make distributions to common stockholders
(either in the form of dividends or through repurchases), 27 or defer paying
off the arrearage on preferred stock. 228 Similarly, if a particular constitu-
ency claims that managers' decision to make an unusually risky invest-
ment129 or to add significantly to the company's debt 20 resulted in a wealth
transfer detrimental to the particular constituency, managers may be able
to defend on the basis of consent to the transaction.
In all of these cases, the analysis of the courts should be the same. If an
investor is able to demonstrate that managers' action decreased the value
of his or her investment, the burden falls on managers to demonstrate con-
sent. In ultimately resolving the particular case, courts should interpret
226. Managers' decision to redeem stock typically is detrimental to the interests of preferred
stockholders. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
227. Senior money investors such as preferred stockholders and creditors (and, for that mat-
ter, employees) can be harmed by dividends and repurchases of common stock that increase the
risk that the company will be unable to meet its obligations to such senior investors.
228. Preferred stockholders whose dividends are in arrears will benefit by the rapid or im-
mediate elimination of the arrearage. Any delay in elimination of the arrearage, therefore, is
contrary to the best interests of preferred stockholders.
229. Numerous commentators have noted the different investment objectives of fixed inves-
tors and residual investors and the fact that an investment that maximizes the value of the corpo-
ration may nonetheless reduce the wealth of fixed investors, who have no right to participate in
earnings above their fixed, contractual amount. See, e.g., Hurst & McGuinnis, supra note 117,
at 195.
230. See discussion supra part V.B. (especially notes 139-45 and accompanying text).
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situations and promulgate specific rules that approximate the most likely
understanding of the parties and promote future economic efficiencies.
G. Constituency Statutes
At first look, one may consider constituency statutes2"' to be consistent
with the principles of this Article. Viewed more critically, however, con-
stituency statutes turn out to be antithetical to the proposed fiduciary prin-
ciples, since the statutes make it easier for managers to undermanage cor-
porate assets and engage in wealth transfers to themselves or favored
constituencies.
Constituency statutes have been enacted in more than one-half of the
states22 and, although the substance of the statutes varies from state to
state, the core of the statutes is similar.233 Generally, the statutes permit
managers23 ' in certain instances, most usually in dealing with takeovers,2"5
to consider the interests of constituencies other than stockholders. The
statutes, with few exceptions,236 however, are discretionary, which means
that managers may, but are not required to, consider the interests of the
other constituencies. The failure by managers to consider the interests of
other constituencies therefore creates no managerial liability for such ac-
tion.237
Managers acting as rational maximizers and faced with a corporate de-
cision have two interests.238 First, managers want, to maximize their own
wealth or utility; second, and this interest is clearly secondary to the first,
managers want to maximize the wealth or utility of voting stockholders,
since voting stockholders appoint managers. Managers, at least as rational
maximizers, are essentially indifferent about the welfare of the other cor-
porate constituencies.239
231. Regarding constituency statutes, see James J. Hanks, Evaluating Recent State Legisla-
tion on Director and Officer Liability Limitation and Indemnification. 43 Bus. LAW. 1207
(1988); Alexander C. Gavis, A Framework for Satisfying Corporate Directors' Responsibilities.
Under State Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes: The Use of Explicit Contracts, 138 U. PA. L,
REV. 1451 (1990).
232. In a 1991 article, Professor O'Connor lists the states having constituency statutes,
O'Connor, supra note 75, at 1229 n.288. In the same year, Hanks put the number of states
adopting constituency statutes at 28. James J. Hanks, Playing with Fire: Nonshareholder Con-
stituency Statutes in the 1990s, 21 STETSON L. REV. 97, 103 (1991).
233. See Hanks, supra note 232, for a description of the variations among states.
234. Constituency statutes protect directors, and some, but not all, cover the actions of offi-
cers as well. Id. at 105.
235. O'Connor, supra note 75, at 1194; Hanks, supra note 232, at 106.
236. Connecticut's constituency statute is mandatory. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-313(e) (West
1994).
237. Stone, Employees as Stakeholders, supra note 76, at 70.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 75-77.
239. This is not entirely accurate, of course, since it is possible that the mistreatment of an-
other constituency may harm the interests of managers or voting stockholders. For example, an
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Because of their discretionary nature, constituency statutes change none
of this. 40 The incentives of managers after the passage of constituency
statutes are exactly the same as the incentives before the statutes; as ra-
tional maximizers, managers still want first to promote their own interests
and then to promote the interests of voting stockholders; they still are in-
different about the interests of other constituencies. The statutes provide
managers as rational maximizers no additional incentives to maximize the
value of the corporation or abstain from wealth transfers from unfavored
constituencies to favored constituencies.
Constituency statutes should not be considered neutral, however, since
such statutes provide an obfuscation opportunity that facilitates managerial
moves that are inconsistent with the Principle Requiring Corporate Value
Maximization and the Principle Prohibiting Wealth Transfers. Thus, man-
agers in pursuit of their own self-interest of ensuring the continuation of
their positions, salaries, and perquisites may, for example, resist a value-
maximizing takeover that threatens their jobs and, under constituency
statutes, may attempt to justify their resistance on the basis of potential
harms to creditors, employees, or the community. Managers as value
maximizers will attempt to hide behind constituency statutes, and courts, if
they take the statutes seriously, will have difficulty in concluding that de-
fensive tactics are inconsistent with the apparently broad latitude granted
managers under constituency statutory norms. 24'
One way out of this problem is proposed by McDaniel, whose views
are similar to many of my own. 242 McDaniel argues that constituency stat-
utes should not be interpreted to permit managers to exercise unfettered
discretion regarding the amount and type of deference that they may ac-
cord constituencies other than stockholders but, instead, that any action
taken by manager under the authority of constituency statutes should be
limited by an obligation to maximize corporate value and avoid wealth
expropriation of creditors' wealth may raise the subsequent cost of capital to the corporation,
which would be contrary to the interests of managers and voting stockholders.
240. Even commentators who share a view that fiduciary duties need to be liberalized are
less than consistent in their views regarding the efficacy of constituency statutes. Stone, Employ-
ees as Stakeholders, supra note 76, at 71, 72 ([Sitatutes have at least "symbolic value"; "despite
their weaknesses, the nonshareholder constituency statutes may nonetheless have value.");
O'Connor, supra note 75, at 1260 ("Although these statutes have not been tested in the courts,
they are a potential source of protection to displaced workers."); McDaniel, supra note 85, at
161 (Statutes are valuable if interpreted with "Pareto efficiency as the economic goal."). For
contrary and more negative views about constituency statutes, see Hanks. supra note 232;
Macey, supra note 138.
241. Professor Macey makes this argument directly. Macey, supra note 138, at 32
("[Vlirtually any management decision, no matter how arbitrary, can be rationalized on the
grounds that it benefits some constituency . ..") (emphasis added). Hanks makes the point
somewhat more indirectly. Hanks, supra note 232, at 113-15 (emphasizing the absence of stan-
dards and the difficulty of monitoring).
242. See McDaniel, supra note 85; McDaniel, supra note 58.
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transfers . 43 Thus, under McDaniel's proposal, managers could not take
any action to protect a constituency if that action either failed to maximize
the value of the corporation or resulted in a wealth transfer.
Certainly if constituency statutes must exist, McDaniel's solution is at-
tractive. Nonetheless, even as interpreted by McDaniel, constituency stat-
utes are a decidedly incomplete remedy. Obviously, constituency statutes
are often limited to managers' actions in takeover situations, while as indi-
cated in this Article, questions regarding fiduciary duties arise in many
and varied situations. Stated more broadly, the matter of fiduciary duties
should be addressed directly and more inclusively and not through a stat-
ute that deals by indirection with only a part of a problem. The better so-
lution (and one with which McDaniel would likely agree at least in part) is
to eliminate the constituency statutes and adopt broadly the principles pro-
posed in this Article.
VI. CONCLUSION
The bid of the Contractarians to eliminate all mandatory fiduciary du-
ties fails principally because the values underlying their position are in-
consistent with the widely shared values of society. Notwithstanding, no
one should be so foolhardy as to argue that the Contractarians' pursuit of
economic efficiency is without any moral justification or support in society
generally, since the pursuit of economic efficiency leads in the direction of
increased total utility and personal autonomy, conditions that are morally
and popularly attractive.
Thus, while most concede the value in the pursuit of economic effi-
ciency, society nonetheless finds the harsh edges of capitalism to be dis-
tasteful and other values to be important and worth pursuing. In short,
economic efficiency is a worthy goal but clearly not the only worthy goal
for society and not a goal that can be pursued without costs.
A world dominated by the pursuit of economic efficiency is often
lacking in grace and kindness, those wonderful human qualities that soci-
ety in its finer moments finds so attractive. In the Contractarians' world,
greed seems at times to be considered a virtue, and the only answer for
individual disappointments is to make a better contract next time.
Society, albeit somewhat imperfectly, demands more of itself in the area
of corporate fiduciary principles. We are demonstrably concerned about
corporate managers' actions that create losers by decreasing the value of
corporations or expropriating the investments of corporate constituencies.
243. McDaniel, supra note 85, at 121-39. McDaniel also argues that constituency statutes
should be interpreted to require that any gains "awarded to stakeholders must bear a reasonable
relationship to the benefits received by stockholders." Id. at 136.
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Our rules set standards that are higher than the basest conduct of the unfet-
tered market.
Pareto criteria represent worthy principles that encapsulate widely
shared values of society and thus provide attractive guidance for the for-
mulation of our corporate fiduciary principles in the post-Contractarian
era.
